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1 INTRODUCTION
The aim of this research dissertation is firstly to undertake a review of international
practice and academic literature in the field of credit derivatives and secondly to compare
this body of research to the practice of credit derivatives in South Africa. The analysis
will cover a wide range of topics, including but not limited to the following:
• The growth of the credit derivatives internationally and in South Africa
• The identification of the basic credit derivative instruments. In this respect, the
credit default swap, credit-linked note and total return swap will be examined
• The uses, benefits, risks and advantages of credit derivatives in both the
international and South African context
• The pricing of credit derivative instruments and the determinants of credit
spreads. The potential problems in credit derivative pricing will be highlighted .
• The legal risks associated with credit derivative documentation, with particular
reference to the efforts of the International Swaps and Derivatives Association
(lSDA), and
• The use of credit derivatives in synthetic securitisation
The research undertaking will canvass and analyse the views of the major credit
derivative practitioners in South Africa. In this regard, the factors both inhibiting and
facilitating the growth of credit derivatives in South Africa will be explored and
highlighted for resolution going forward. As noted below, there are few practitioners of
credit derivatives in South Africa, being limited currently to the large banking
institutions: Standard Bank, ABSA, Investee and NIB. A questionnaire, open ended in
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nature will be used as an instrument in the collation and analysis of actual credit,
derivative practice in South Africa.
Credit derivatives are in fact privately negotiated bilateral contracts that allow users to
manage their exposure to credit risk. For example, a bank concerned that one of its
customers may not be able to repay a loan can protect itself against loss by transferring
the credit risk to another party while keeping the loan on its books. Credit risk is the
possibility that a borrower will fail to service or repay a debt on time. The degree of risk
is reflected in the borrower's credit rating, which defines the premium over the risk-free
borrowing rate it pays for funds and ultimately the market price of its debt. Credit
derivatives have two variables: market risk and firm specific risk. Market risk can be
defined as those factors that affect all participants in the market place, such as interest
rate movements. Credit derivatives allow users to isolate, price and trade firm specific
credit risk by unbundling a debt instrument into its component parts and transferring each
risk to those suited to managing it. There are various traditional mechanisms to reduce
credit risk including refusal to make a loan, insurance products, guarantees and letters of
credit, but these mechanisms are less effective during periods of downturn when risks
that normally offset each other simultaneously default. Internationally, credit derivatives
have emerged as a major risk management tool in recent years. The total volume of




The bank for International Settlements (BIS) and the US Office of the Controller of the
Currency (OCC) have both released reports (June 2002) indicating that credit derivatives
has received a significant boost from the loss of confidence in corporate governance and
accounting. However, the BIS report also makes it clear that the vexed question of
defining a credit default swap remains a serious problem.
The OCC's quarterly report reveals that derivatives held by US commercial banks
increased by $3,8 trillion in the second quarter of 2002, to reach a total of $ 50.1 trillion.
In addition, the report states that the sharp rise in volumes can be attributed to a
breakdown in corporate governance this year - "Risk Managers typically respond to
greater uncertainty by reshaping their risk profiles, and that explains the sharp rise in
derivative notional volumes during the second quarter" (June 2002).
The BIS Quarterly Review, on the other hand, talks of an "eventful" period for the credit
derivatives market. Mirroring the findings of the OCC, the BIS report says that
Argentina's default on its sovereign debt and the collapse of Enron has led to many more
investors looking to credit derivatives as a way of hedging and trading both sovereign and
corporate risk. The authors note that Argentina's debt default at the end of last year
underlined the need for precise documentation in credit derivatives. This is an issue that
has dogged the credit derivatives market in the past, notably after the Russian debt
default of 1998. While Argentina's debt repudiation was a clear cut "trigger" event for
credit default swaps written under the International Swaps and Derivative Association's
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(ISDA) 1999 credit derivative definitions, the BlS says there "was less agreement
concerning a $50 billion debt exchange" conducted by Argentina in November 2001.
What is clear from both reports, however, is the degree of disquiet that is being felt in the
market at the extent of bad governance and dubious accounting - and the fact that this has
translated into an increased demand for credit default protection.
The South African Context
A healthy market in credit derivatives has sprung to life in recent months in South Africa,
despite the lack of a domestic corporate bond market. In response to keen demand from
asset managers eager to invest in higher yield paper, banks have compensated for the
almost complete absence of corporate bonds by creating yield enhancing credit
derivatives (e.g. credit-linked notes).
The notes are just like bonds; with the credit default risk embedded in their structure.
Local demand for corporate paper is unprecedented and arises from a number of factors.
These include:
• The drop in government bond yields over the past six months from just over 12% to
all time record lows under 10% (the yields have risen slightly since the terrorist attack
on New York)
• A general shortage of government bonds
• A lowering of inflation expectations due to the introduction of inflation targets by the
South African Reserve Bank (SARB) last year and the appalling performance of the
local equity markets.
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Currently, there are four local banks trading credit derivatives - Standard Corporate and
Merchant Bank, ABSA, Gensec and Investec. Some of the international banks are also
looking to join the fray. However, participation by the international banks is hindered by
low spreads (the difference between risk-free rates and the cost of borrowing to the
borrower). Government exchange control regulations do not allow local banks to take
much of their funds offshore, resulting in too much local money chasing too few credits.
This has led to stiff competition and what is regarded as a general under pricing of credit
risk in the local market.
Regulations governing the credit derivatives market have not yet been officially
promulgated by the South African Reserve Bank (SARB), although a working group has
drafted proposals based on international best practice. The lack of formal regulations
however, has not stifled the development of credit derivatives in South Africa. This is on
the basis that the banks are well informed about risk reporting guidelines, and liaise
frequently with the SARB on their credit derivative transactions. One of the most
interesting aspects concerning the development of the credit derivative markets is that it
is likely to lead to a creation of a liquid, accurately priced corporate bond market in the
country. The new synthetic credit-linked notes act as an excellent price discovery
mechanism for local companies considering bond issues. The banks will be able to go to
potential issuers with the actual prices of their credit-linked notes, so that they have an
accurate picture of the cost of a bond issue. With investor demand for corporate credit at
its highest levels, it is not likely to be long before a liquid corporate bond market
develops in South Africa.
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3 A LITERATURE REVIEW
There are two primary types of risks faced by firms engaged in financial transactions.
These are market risk and credit risk. The former is the risk that movements in interest
rates, exchange rates, and stock prices or commodities prices will have an effect on the
firm's value. The latter is the risk that counter parties to transactions will fail to make
obliged payments. Credit risk is sometimes called default risk (Chance, 1997). The
management of market risk is achieved by entering into offsetting or hedging
transactions. Credit risk is more difficult to manage. Typical methods of controlling
credit risk include limiting the amount of business a party does with another party,
requiring collateral etc. While these methods reduce credit risk, they are not adequate to
manage credit risk (Chance, 1997). Credit derivatives can help banks, financial
companies, and investors manage the credit risk of their investments by insuring against
adverse movements in the credit quality of the borrower. If the borrower defaults, the
investor will suffer losses on the investment, but the losses can be offset by gains from
the credit derivative (Neal, 1996).
Internationally, there are three major types of credit derivatives: Total Return Swaps,
Credit Default Swaps, and Credit-linked Notes (Kothari, 1996).
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4 CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS
According to Douglas-lones (Futures and Options World, Autumn 2001) the credit
default swap has come a long way since its inception in 1996. Initially viewed as a
complex and exotic product, Douglas-lones says that default swaps soon shot to fame as
the "next big thing". The possibilities were endless. However, unforeseen dangers in the
form of the Russian and Asian crises lurked around the corner. The problem was one of
documentation, a difficulty that has plagued the market throughout its life (Douglas-
lones, 2001). The central question was what constituted a "default". According to
Douglas-lones, the industry worked hard with ISDA to develop a standard form
confirmation of the credit derivative contract (see discussion later for an elaboration of
this point). This development, in 1999, revolutionized the market with the result that
confidence was restored and the market witnessed credit derivative contracts paying out
in the instance of default. With the furore over the restructuring issue came more
documentation woes and uncertainty. As with the previous concern over what
constituted a "default", the uncertainty threatened the liquidity of the market and the
further sustained development of the credit derivatives market. Once again, ISDA came
to the rescue with the Restructuring Supplement (Douglas lones, 2001).
Vinod Kothari (1996), an Indian academic and authority in the field of securitisation and
credit derivatives, defines a credit default swap as a contract under which one party ("the
protection seller") agrees to compensate another party ("the protection buyer") for the
financial loss it may occur following the occurrence of a "credit event" in relation to a
"reference amount" or notional amount of a credit obligation (usually a bond or loan).
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According to Kothari (1996), credit default swaps are over the counter contracts and are
usually based on ISDA documentation and definitions.
The economic effect of a credit default swap is similar to that of an insurance contract or
guarantee. The protection buyer pays a premium to the protection seller and receives
credit protection; in the same way a guarantor receives a fee for accepting credit risk
(Kothari, 1996).
According to Kothari (1996), the basic credit default swap can be described as follows:
In return for assuming the underlying credit risk, the protection buyer pays an agreed
premium to the protection seller, normally at regular intervals over the term of the
transaction. The protection buyer will receive a payment from the protection seller upon
the occurrence of a "credit event" in respect of the credit obligation ("the reference











The obligation of the reference entity, to which the credit default swap is referenced, is
known as the "reference obligation". The parties to the transaction may decide to
identify a single specific reference obligation or some or all of the obligations of the
reference entity. Often the credit default swap will be referenced to "borrowed money".
Borrowed money is debt that ranks at least equal in priority of payment with senior
unsecured obligations of the reference entity. After a credit event, the protection buyer
may have to deliver to the protection seller a deliverable obligation which will normally
be any unsecured debt obligation of the reference entity.
The value of the credit default swap and hence the premium will depend on a number of
factors. These include:
• The absolute value of, and expected movement in, the credit quality of the reference
entity and the volatility of that reference quality
• The maturity of the credit derivative
• The credit status of the protection seller
• The number and types of credit events included in the contract
• The joint probability of default of the protection seller and reference entity
• The nature of the payment being cash, physical, binary etc
• Other risks incorporated within the derivative (e.g. foreign exchange and interest rate
risk) (Kothari, 1996).
The ISDA definitions set out six credit events that can trigger payment on a credit default
swap. These are as follows:
• Bankruptcy






On occurrence of a credit event, the protection buyer will normally have to deliver notice
of the credit event to the protection seller, and if specified in the contract, notice of
publicly available information with which to confirm the occurrence of the event. In
addition, if there is physical settlement, the protection buyer must deliver notice of
intended physical settlement to the protection seller.
Jessica James, Vice President and head of Research at First National Bank of Chicago in
London (2000) says that a credit default swap can either be physically settled or cash
settled. Whilst the contract is typically based on physical settlement with the option of
cash settlement, the contract will usually cash settle. Physical settlement involves the
delivery of an obligation of the underlying reference entity ("the deliverable obligation"),
as set out in the contract, in return for cash settlement of the reference amount. If there is
a difference between the market value and par value of the reference obligation on the
date the credit default swap is transacted, this will be factored into the calculation of the
premium (lames, 2000).
The deliverable obligation may be a reference obligation or one of a class of obligations
that meets certain specifications. The deliverable obligation is often senior unsecured
debt of the reference entity. Following a credit event, there can sometimes be a shortage
of the deliverable obligations as demand exceeds supply. This may cause a problem for
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the protection buyer if the deliverable obligation has to be purchased and could lead to a
defaulted deliverable obligation trading at an artificially high price.
According to lames (2000), credit default swaps may be entirely cash settled. The cash
settlement amount is calculated by the calculation agent, as denoted in the contract, as the
reference value less the "final value" of the reference obligation after the credit event.
The final value is determined by the calculation agent and is the market value of the
reference obligation on valuation date.
According to lames (2000), a number of variations of the credit default swap have been
developed. These are as follows:
• Basket or portfolio trades
Basket or portfolio trades are credit default swaps that are based on a number of
reference entities documented in one contract rather than a number of individual
credit default swaps
• Termination options and refundable credit default swap
A termination option within the credit default swap allows the contract to be
terminated prior to the agreed maturity date. A common usage of termination options
in credit default swaps is to enable effective protection to be purchased on revolving
credit lines where the facility may be repaid early and hence the protection is no
longer needed.
• Credit Spread Options
Credit spread options have a strike price based on a credit spread above the risk free
rate. The option will be exercised if the credit spread of the underlying reference
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entity moves above or below this strike price depending on whether this option is a
PUT or CALL option respectively.
In terms of a guide written by Davies, Hewer and Rivett (The Financial Jungle: A guide
to Credit Derivatives, 2001), the following benefits, risks and disadvantages accrue to
both the protection buyer and seller.
Benefits to the protection buyer
• The credit default swap allows the protection buyer to eliminate or reduce the credit
risk associated with exposure to a reference entity without selling or transferring the
underlying obligation. A transfer/sale may not be possible for legal reasons or the
bank may wish to maintain an ongoing customer relationship.
• The protection buyer does not have to own any debt obligations of the underlying
reference entity in order to enter into a credit default swap. The protection buyer can
therefore use the credit default swap to speculate on the credit quality of the reference
entity and will benefit should the credit quality of the reference entity deteriorate.
The protection buyer is therefore taking a "short" credit position.
• The protection buyer may obtain a reduced regulatory capital charge on the
underlying exposure provided the credit default swap meets the required regulatory
conditions. Currently, under most regulatory jurisdictions, a regulatory capital saving
may be available to a bank if a credit exposure to a non-bank obligor can be
substituted for an OEeD bank exposure. The protection buyer can reduce the risk
weightings from 100% to 20%. Under the proposed BASEL Accord rules, the
calculation of regulatory charge may change
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Benefits to the protection seller
• The credit default swap creates a synthetic credit position for the protection seller.
This enables the protection seller to gain an exposure to the reference entity without
having to
Fund the position outright and incur either the associated funding cost or, for
loans, the cost of establishing and maintaining a relationship with the reference
entity; and
Add any operational infrastructure needed to manage the reference obligations.
• The protection seller can tailor the synthetic credit position to create the required
credit risk/return profile, which may not be available in the cash market. For
example, an institution may want to obtain an 8 year exposure to a reference entity
but there are only 5 and 10 year remaining maturity bonds available
• Credit default swaps are useful to a protection seller that wants to gain exposure to
particular markets or counter parties but cannot own the underlying debt obligations
of the reference entity directly. This may be because of legal or regulatory
restrictions or because of a lack of liquidity
• The protection seller will receive an income stream from the protection buyer in
return for the protection written.
• Depending on the relative funding costs of the protection seller and protection buyer
there can be a funding advantage gained by entering into a credit derivative.
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Risks and disadvantages to tlte protection buyer
• If the protection buyer enters into the credit default swap to hedge an underlying
exposure it is exposed to potential basis risk. Basis risk arises from a mismatch
between the underlying asset and the hedge in either economic or legal terms. Thus,
the protection buyer could potentially suffer a loss on the underlying credit exposure
that is not fully compensated by the receipt under the credit default swap. This could
arise if the credit default swap is not triggered, despite a severe deterioration in the
credit quality of the underlying exposure because a credit event, as defined in the
credit default swap documentation, has not actually occurred.
• The credit worthiness of the protection seller is a key consideration for the protection
buyer. The protection buyer has a contingent credit exposure to the protection seller
because the protection seller may not be able to meet its obligations following a credit
event. As a result, the correlation between the credit quality of the protection seller
and the reference entity is a key factor in the pricing of the protection. There is a
higher probability that a counter party that is positively correlated to the reference
entity may not be able to meet its obligations when a credit event occurs on the
reference entity. This risk can be reduced significantly by the use of collateral
• The processing of all credit derivative trades is subject to significant operational risk.
In particular, basket trades, which can be complex and have numerous underlying
reference obligations, can present particular trade processing challenges. The
protection buyer needs to establish a robust operational infrastructure in order to
monitor effectively the basket of reference obligations for credit events and to be able
to model and value the transaction correctly
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Risks and disadvantages to the protection seller
• On the occurrence of a credit event, the protection seller will have to make a payment
to the protection buyer
• The protection seller is exposed to potential basis risk in the same way as the
protection buyer. As explained above, the basis risk arises from a mismatch between
the two contracts in either economic or legal terms. For the protection seller, basis
risk is likely to arise when hedging one credit default swap with another. Basis risk
can be compounded if the credit default swap is not based on the standard ISDA
documentation. The majority of credit default swaps are based on ISDA
documentation and definitions and it may therefore be difficult to find a counter party
willing to trade on non-ISDA terms. In this situation, the protection seller could be
exposed to some residual risk. Institutions introducing basis risk, however, often
amend the ISDA standard terms and definitions.
• The protection seller is exposed to the credit worthiness of the protection buyer
(counter party) for the premium payments due under the credit default swap. The
exposure is relatively small as payments are usually made either in advance or on a
regular basis throughout the life of a swap and are small in comparison with the value
of the reference obligation.
• The processing of all credit derivatives trades is subject to significant operational risk.
In particular, basket trades which can be complex and have numerous underlying
reference obligations, present particular processing challenges. The protection seller
needs to establish a robust operational infrastructure in order to monitor effectively
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the basket of reference obligations for credit events and to be able to model and value
the transaction correctly.
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5 TOTAL RETURN SWAPS
Davies, Hewer and Rivett (2001) defines a total return swap as a contract under which
one party ("the total return payer") transfers the economic risks and rewards associated
with an underlying asset to another counter party ("the total return receiver"). The
transfer of risks and rewards is effected by way of an exchange of cash flows that mirror
changes in the value of the underlying asset and any income derived therefrom. All total
return swap contracts are aTe contracts and at present there are no standard contractual
definitions specific to the product (Davies, Hewer, Rivett, 2001).
In contrast to a credit default swap, a total return swap transfers the credit risk and the
market risk associated with an underlying asset. The economic effect for a total return
receiver is equivalent to that derived from owning the asset. The total return receiver,
however, does not incur the direct costs of funding the purchase of the underlying asset
(e.g. a bond or a loan or certain other costs normally associated with ownership). In
addition the total return receiver has no relationship with the borrower and no refinancing
obligations. The total return receiver makes a payment to the total return payer that
compensates the latter for the funding costs. As a result, the total return receiver and the
total return payer in a total return swap are equivalent to the protection seller and
protection buyer respectively in a credit default swap, i.e. the total return payer and
protection buyer seek risk protection (Davies, Hewer and Rivett, 2001).
According to Davies, Hewer and Rivett (2001), the basic credit default swap can be
illustrated as follows: the total return payer will make periodic payments to the total
return receiver comprising the coupons/interest from the underlying asset and an amount,
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if any, equivalent to the appreciation in the market value of the underlying asset. If the
value of the reference asset depreciates, a payment would be paid by the total return
receiver to the total return payer, together with a regular floating rate payment, normally
based on LIBOR plus or minus a financing spread.
. TOTAL RETURN SWAP .
PRFMTTTM
,.




The asset to which a total return swap is referenced is known as the reference obligation.
The parties to the transaction can decide to identify a single specific reference obligation,
a number of reference obligations or a market index (Davies, Hewer and Rivett, 2001).
According to Davies, Hewer and Rivett (2001), total return swaps are generally
referenced to assets traded in a liquid market or an index so that the market price can be
accurately determined by the calculation. The total return payer will typically own the
reference obligation that is the subject of the total return swap. Alternatively, according
to Davies, Hewer and Rivett (2001), if the total return payer does not hold the obligation,
the swap will create a "short" position in the market and credit risk of that asset. The
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total return payer normally retains the servicing and any voting rights associated with the
underlying reference obligation.
The premium is the "fee" paid by the total return receiver to the total return payer and
usually comprises a LIBOR based payment. A key factor in the calculation of the
premium is the relative credit quality of the two counter parties and the reference
obligation. This will determine the spread above or below the floating index. The total
return payer will seek to recover the cost of financing (and servicing) the reference
obligation and should achieve this where its cost of funding is cheaper than the total
return receiver. In fact a total return receiver allows a low cost borrower to "rent" its
balance sheet to a high cost borrower at a price that is cost effective to both parties
(Davies, Hewer and Rivett, 2001).
As indicated above, with a credit default swap, total return swap contracts can include
credit events. On occurrence of a credit event, a total return swap on a single reference
obligation will normally terminate and a final payment will be made to reflect the
decrease in the value of the reference obligation.
The payments between the total return payer and total return receiver are based on the
changes in market value of the reference obligation. Cash settlement of the amounts
relating to the market value movements of the reference obligation can be made either at
maturity of the transaction or periodically throughout its life. Payments of income
derived from the asset and the premium are normally settled on a periodic basis and are
often netted, together with any market value payment if this is also paid periodically.
Total return swap contracts can also involve physical delivery of the reference obligation
at maturity by the total return payer to the total return receiver in return for a payment
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equal to the final value of the reference obligation plus or minus any market value
appreciation or depreciation payments made during the life of the contract (Davies,
Hewer and Rivett, 2001).
As with other aTC derivative contracts, collateral can be requested in relation to the
transaction to mitigate counter party credit risk. Collateral may be in the form of
securities or cash. There are four considerations when determining the amount of
collateral to be called from a counter party:
• The credit-worthiness of the counter party
• The fair value of the credit derivative
• The nature of collateral to be placed by the counter party; and
• The correlation between the credit quality of the counter party, the reference
obligation and any collateral posted. Collateral that exhibits a high correlation with
either the counter party or the reference obligation may be of little use as a credit risk
mitigant
Market value payments need to be made by the total return payer or the total return
receiver, dependant on whether the value of the reference obligation has appreciated or
depreciated. The higher rated counter party will normally call for collateral from the
counter party with a low credit rating, once the amount payable exceeds a pre-agreed
limit. Collateral is more likely to be called where there has been a large market
movement and the associated market value payment is not due until some future date
(Davies, Hewer and Rivett, 2001). According to Davies, Hewer and Rivett (2001), total
return swaps may be used for tax arbitrage purposes. For example, a transaction can be
structured to alleviate withholding tax on the receipt of income from a security. In some
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markets, withholding tax is not levied on an investor if a resident of the relevant country
or region owns a security. A third party investor may therefore take out a tot~l return
swap with a resident counter party on such an underlying asset. The resident counter
party will receive the income on the security gross. This is then paid to the investor
under the total return swap, thereby enabling the investor to avoid the withholding tax
that would be incurred if it held the security directly. The savings made under this type
of transaction are normally shared between the two parties (Davies, Hewer and Rivett,
2001).
In comparing total return swaps to asset swaps, Davies, Hewer and Rivett (2001) makes
the following point: Asset swaps involve both a sale of an asset to a counter party and an
interest rate swap packaged into a single transaction. In the case of bonds, the asset will
usually be a fixed rate instrument and the investor is seeking a floating rate return. The
investment bank will therefore package the fixed rate bond with an interest rate swap,
swapping the fixed return on a bond for a floating return, thereby providing an investor
with a synthetic floating rate asset. The main difference between an asset swap and a
total return swap is that the asset swap involves an outright sale of the bond to the
investor whereas the total return swap does not involve the sale of the reference
obligation on which it is based.
An equity swap is essentially a total return swap based on an equity instrument. The
counter party swaps the entire return on an equity-based asset (i.e. appreciation in value
and dividends received) in return for a LIBOR based payment and payments to
compensate for any depreciation in value. Neither an equity swap nor a total return swap
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involves the purchase or sale of the referenced equity/asset and both lead to the creation
of synthetic asset positions (Davies, Hewer and Rivett, 2001).
Davies, Hewer and Rivett (200 I) lists the following benefits, risks and advantages to the
investor and protection buyer of using credit derivatives:
Benefits to tlte total return payer
• The total return swap allows the total return payer to eliminate or reduce the market
and credit risk associated with a reference obligation without selling or transferring
the underlying obligation, and without knowledge of the reference obligor. The
transfer/sale may not be possible for legal reasons or the bank may wish to avoid
harming an ongoing customer relationship
• The total return payer does not have to own any debt obligations of the underlying
reference obligation in order to enter into the total return swap. The total return payer
can therefore use the total return swap to "short" the market and credit risk of the
reference obligation. The total return payer will therefore benefit from any
depreciation in the market value of the underlying reference obligation as an
equivalent amount will be due, under the terms of the total return swap, from the total
return receiver.
• The total return payer may obtain a reduced regulatory capital charge on the
underlying exposure provided the total return swap meets the required regulatory
conditions. Currently, in most regulatory jurisdictions, a regulatory capital saving
may be available to a bank if a credit risk exposure to a non-bank obligor can be
substituted for an OECD bank exposure. The total return payer can reduce the risk
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weighting from 100% to 20%. Under the proposed Basel Accord rules, the
calculation of regulatory capital charge may change
• Depending on the relative funding costs of the total return payer and the total return
receiver, there can be a funding advantage gained by entering into a total return swap.
• The total return payer will receive an income stream that should cover the carrying
cost of the asset. In that sense, as the total return payer is incurring the direct cost of
owning the asset, it may be regarded as providing the counter party with the use of its
balance sheet
• The total return payer may be able to alter the timing of tax liabilities that would arise
if the underlying asset was sold rather than hedged with a total return swap.
Benefits to the total return receiver
• The total return swap creates a synthetic asset position for the total return receiver.
This enables the total return receiver:
To gain credit and market exposure to the reference asset without having to fund
the position outright and incur the associated funding cost and, for a loan, the cost
of establishing and maintaining a relationship with the reference entity; and
To manage its balance sheet, allowing it to create synthetic positions rather than
on balance sheet positions. For example, the total return receiver could sell an
asset but retain the risks and economic performance associated with it through a
total return swap
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• Total return swaps are useful to a total return receiver that wants to gain exposure to a
particular market or counter party but cannot own the underlying debt obligations of
the reference entity directly
• The total return receiver receives the interest income relating to the reference
obligation and benefits from any market value appreciation associated with the
reference obligation
• Banks with comparatively high funding costs tend to invest in riskier assets to
provide a commensurately higher return. A bank could use a total return swap to
diversify its portfolio into lower risk assets by making use of the total return payer's
lower cost of funding
Risks and disadvantages to the total return payer
• If the total return payer has an unhedged position then it will be exposed to any
appreciation in the market value of the underlying reference obligation as an
equivalent amount will be payable, under the terms of the total return swap, to the
total return receiver
• A total return swap might also involve basis risk similar to that which can arise in
credit default swaps, due to mismatch in economic or legal terms. For example, the
total return swap may be denominated in dollars but the underlying reference
obligation may be denominated in euros
• When the total return payer holds the underlying reference obligation so that it has a
hedged position, any mismatches in settlement terms between the total return swap
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and the underlying reference obligation will give rise to cash flow mismatches that
will need to be funded
• Total return swaps based on a basket of reference obligations can be complex and
have a large number of reference obligations. The processing and monitoring of
basket trades can therefore be subject to high levels of operational risk
Risks and disadvantages to the total return receiver
• If the total return receiver has no offsetting position then it will be exposed to any
depreciation in the market value of the underlying reference obligation as an
equivalent amount will be payable, under the terms of the total return swap, to the
total return payer
• The total return receiver is exposed to potential basis risk in the same way as the total
return payer. As explained above, the basis risk arises from a mismatch in either
economic or legal terms between the two contracts. For the total return receiver,
basis risk is likely to arise when the offsetting one total return swap with another
• The credit worthiness of the total return payer is a key consideration for the total
return receiver, which has an exposure to the total return payer for any market value
appreciation. Counter party risk can be reduced by the use of collateral
• The total return receiver is also exposed to the credit worthiness of the total return
payer for the interest income derived from the reference obligation. This exposure is
relatively small as payments are usually made on a regular basis throughout the life of
the swap and are small in comparison with the value of the reference obligation
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• Total return swaps based on a basket of reference obligations can be complex and
have a large number of reference obligations. The processing and monitoril1;g of the
basket trades can therefore be subject to high levels of operational risk. The total
return payer needs to establish a robust operational infrastructure in order to mitigate
the operational risk associated with these type of transactions
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6 CREDIT-LINKED NOTES
Davies, Hewer and Rivett (2001) defines a credit-linked note as an instrument under
which one party ("the issuer") issues a note to another party ("the investor") in return for
consideration equal to the principal value (assuming the note is issued at par) of the note.
The coupon on the note is linked to both the credit quality of the issuer and an obligation
("the reference obligation") of a third party ("the reference entity"). According to
Davies, Hewer and Rivett (2001), credit-linked notes are often listed on a stock exchange
and although there are specific standard ISDA definitions for credit-linked notes, they
often incorporate the ISDA credit derivative definitions.
In the most common form, credit-linked notes are medium term notes with an embedded
credit default swap (Davies, Hewer and Rivett, 2001). The investor receives a regular
LIBOR based coupon on the credit-linked note from the issuer normally payable
quarterly, semi-annually or annually. The coupon is priced above or below the floating
rate index to compensate the investor for assuming the credit risk of the reference entity
and the issuer. On maturity the issuer will redeem the credit-linked note at par provided
there have not been any credit events arising in relation to the reference obligation.
The issuer will normally be a bank or a special purpose vehicle ("SPV"). Where an SPY
is used, the SPY will be bankruptcy remote to ring fence the transaction from the
sponsoring bank, thereby providing some protection to the bank against reputationa1 risk.
The use of an Spy can also, dependent on the exact structure, allow the SPY's credit










PAR LESS DIMINUTION IN
VALUE OF REFERENCE OBLIGATION
The Spy will issue the credit-linked note to investors and use the proceeds in one of two
ways. Firstly, the Spy may purchase a medium term note ("MTN") from the bank and
sell protection on the reference obligation included within the credit-linked note to either
the bank or another counter party. The premium from the credit default swap and the
return from the MTN will enable the issuer to pay an enhanced coupon on the credit-
linked note. The counter party to the credit default swap is normally the bank as the SPY
is in effect restricted in the choice of counter party as it has no assets to place as collateral
against the credit default swap (Davies, Hewer and Rivett, 2001).
Secondly, the SPY can use the proceeds to purchase the collateral, normally government
bonds or similar low risk securities and place these with the counter party, usually the
bank, as collateral for the credit default swap. The coupon on the collateral, plus the
premium on the credit default swap, will pay the enhanced coupon on the credit-linked
note. According to Davies, Hewer and Rivett (2001), this structure is very similar to the
structures used in some synthetic securitisations (discussed at a later stage). The issuer of
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a credit-linked note is equivalent to the protection buyer in a "fully funded" credit default
swap. The issuer pays a premiwn over the normal funding rate to the investor that is in
effect the same as the premium in a credit default swap. The redemption amount reflects
any credit events experienced by the reference entity, equivalent to the contingent
payment under the default swap. The credit events will be defined in the credit-linked
note documentation and will usually be based on the ISDA definitions.
The investor in the credit-linked note is equivalent to the protection seller. Provided that
the credit events are not experienced by the reference entity and the issuer does not
default, the investor will receive a regular coupon and par on redemption. If there is a
credit event, the amount paid to the investor will be significantly less than par reflecting
the effect of the credit event on the value of the underlying reference entity.
For an investor, credit-linked notes create credit exposures to both the issuer and the
reference entity. While economically credit-linked notes are similar to fully collaterised
credit default swaps, the risks are very different. In a collaterised transaction, if the issuer
defaults, the collateral should still be available to the investor whereas in a credit-linked
note the investor has credit exposure to both the issuer and the reference entity.
Credit-linked notes are sometimes compared to securities guaranteed by third parties.
They differ significantly, however, in that the investors in securities guaranteed by third
parties will only experience a credit loss if both the issuer and guarantor default. With a
credit-linked note, the investor may experience a credit loss if either the issuer or the
reference entity defaults (Davies, Hewer and Rivett, 2001).
The credit quality of the reference entity will usually be lower than the credit quality of
the issuer of the credit-linked note. The credit risk of the reference entity in the note
30
provides the enhancement to the return to the investor - if the credit quality of the
reference entity were superior to that of the issuer then the issuer would be more likely to
issue a plain vanilla bond.
The asset to which the credit-linked note is referenced is known as the reference
obligation. The parties to the transaction can decide to identify a single specific reference
obligation, a number of reference obligations or a market index.
In general, credit-linked notes are referenced to "borrowed money" of the reference
entity, being debt that ranks at least equal in priority of payment with senior unsecured
obligations of the reference entity.
The coupon on the credit-linked note will be a LIBOR based payment that will
compensate the investor for taking on both the credit risk of the issuer and the underlying
reference obligation. A key factor in the determination of the coupon is therefore the
relative credit quality of the two counter parties (Davies, Hewer and Rivett, 2001).
Credit-linked notes are debt instruments redeemable by the issuer at a specified time in
the future and are usually issued at par value. Prior to redemption, the value of a credit-
linked note is primarily dependent on the credit quality of the reference entity. If the
reference entity experiences a decline in its credit standing then the credit-linked note
will fall in value. Following a credit event in respect of the reference entity, the notes
will be redeemed below their par value normally resulting in a loss to the note holders.
The loss would be similar to that experienced by the protection seller in a credit default
swap (Davies, Hewer and Rivett, 2001).
The redemption amount is calculated by the calculation agent, as denoted in the contract,
as par less the difference between the reference value and the final value of the reference
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obligation after the credit event. The final value is determined by the calculation agent
and is the market value of the reference obligation on the valuation date. The v,aluation
date, or dates, is effectively either a specified number of business days or, if not
specified, 5 business days after the notice of a credit event. The calculation agent is
usually one of the counter parties rather than an independent third party and is identified
in the contract.
Credit-linked notes specify credit events following which the credit-linked note will not
redeem at par, reflecting the decrease in value of the reference obligation due to the credit
event. The credit-linked note can either be designed to redeem immediately on the
occurrence of a credit event or to continue until the stated maturity of the note.
On occurrence of a credit event, the issuer will normally have to deliver notice of the
credit event to the investor and, if specified in the contract, notice of publicly available
. information with which to confirm the occurrence of the event. In addition, if there is
physical settlement, the issuer must deliver notice of intended physical settlement to the
investor (Davies, Hewer and Rivett, 2001).
Credit-linked notes can be structured to tailor the risks that are replicated within the note
to the issuer's and investor's requirements (Hewer, Davies, Rivett, 2001).
Total return credit-linked notes
In the total return credit-linked notes, the prepayment of principal on the credit-linked
note is linked to the market value movements of the reference obligation, i.e. market and
credit risk. The credit-linked note can therefore redeem below par even if there is no
credit event. These types of credit-linked notes can be referenced to a single reference
32
obligation, multiple reference obligations or an index and are in effect medium term notes
with embedded total return swaps.
Credit spread credit-linked notes
Credit spread credit-linked notes have the repayment of principal linked to the
movements in the credit spread on the reference entity. The credit spread is the
differential between the yield on a reference entity's debt and risk free rate. This could
be by way of an embedded callable credit spread option, whereby if the credit spread of
the reference entity reaches a certain level, the option would be exercised by the issuer
and the repayment of principal would be reduced.
Deep discounted credit-linked notes
Credit-linked notes can be constructed to provide no periodic interest payments or
interest payments that are significantly below market rates (i.e. zero coupon or deep
discount bonds). Such credit-linked notes are sold at a discount to their nominal value
and the investor's return is derived from the difference between the purchase price and
redemption value.
Basket credit-linked notes
Credit-linked notes can be referenced to a number of reference obligations and
documented in one contract rather than numerous individual contracts. The redemption
value of the credit-linked note will depend on the credit quality of the reference
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obligations in the basket and whether any credit events have occurred on those referenced
obligations.
In terms of the guide written by Davies, Hewer and Rivett (200 I), the following risks,
benefits, advantages accrue to the investor and protection seller from using credit
derivatives.
Benefits to the issuer
• The principal benefit to the issuer of a credit-linked note is that the note provides a
mechanism for hedging and transferring credit risk. As the proceeds of the note are
received from the investor by the issuer, the issuer is not exposed to counter party
risk, as is the case with a credit default swap.
• A credit-linked note provides the issuer with an additional way of raising debt.
• The issuer can "short" the credit risk of the underlying reference entity (i.e. create
exposure equivalent to a loan) by not owning any debt obligations of the underlying
reference entity defined in the credit-linked note
• The issuer may obtain a reduced regulatory capital charge, potentially zero, on the
underlying credit exposure provided the credit-linked note meets the required
regulatory capital conditions (e.g. where risk is effectively cash collaterised). Under
the proposed BASEL Accord rules, the calculation of regulatory capital may change
• If the credit-linked note is issued via a bankruptcy remote SPY, it allows the
transaction to be ring-fenced and provides some protection for the originating bank
against reputational risk.
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Benefits to the investor (protection seller)
• The ability of the investor to access new classes of credit risk through a credit-linked
note allows an investor to diversify from its traditional core credit concentrations into
new assets
• Credit-linked notes provide access to new markets that may not be available in the
cash market. For example, the credit risk associated with part of a bank's loan book
or an individual loan can be passed on to investors who would not have access to such
assets by purchasing a credit-linked note. This allows the investors to take on the
credit risk of the reference portfolio or loan without the need to establish the banking
relationship
• Credit-linked notes allow new classes of investors, such as mutual funds or certain
insurance companies that are not permitted to invest either directly in the reference
entity or in derivatives to take exposure to that reference entity. The investors may be
restricted due to external regulatory reasons, legal reasons, or internal policy
guidelines
• Credit-linked notes allow investors to take exposure to the reference entity for a
tailored period. For example, the reference entity may only issue IO-year bonds but
the investor may want exposure to a five-year bond. This can be achieved through a
credit-linked note
• The investor will receive an enhanced yield on the credit-linked note compared with a
standard bond issued by the issuer, as the investor is exposed to the credit risk of both
the issuer and reference entity and the coupon on the note will reflect this increased
level of risk
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• The investor can gam credit exposure to an underlying reference entity without
having to own any of the reference entity's obligations directly. This allows the
investor to ensure that it does not hold, and therefore have to manage, a defaulted
obligation should there be a credit event.
Risks to the issuer
• The issuer has to pay a higher interest rate on the finance raised, compared to
standard debt instruments of the same rating, to compensate the purchaser of the note
for the exposure to the reference entity as well as the issuer risk.
• Assuming the issuer is issuing the credit-linked note to hedge an underlying exposure,
the issuer has an exposure to potential basis risk as the terms of the credit-linked note
may not match exactly those of the underlying exposure. Basis risk is the risk of
mismatch in economic or legal terms between the underlying exposure and the note.
• A credit-linked note is effectively a medium term note with an embedded credit
derivative. The processing of all credit derivative trades is subject to significant
operational risk. In particular, basket trades, which can be complex and have
numerous underlying reference obligations, can present particular trade processing
challenges. The protection buyer needs to establish a robust operational infrastructure
in order to monitor effectively the basket of reference obligations for credit events
and to be able to model and value the transaction correctly.
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Risks to the investor (protection seller)
• The investor has credit exposure to both the credit risk of the issuer of the note and of
the reference entity. On the occurrence of a credit event on the reference entity, the
note will not redeem at its par value. Even if there is no credit event on the reference
entity, the investor is still exposed to any default by the issuer on a coupon payment
or redemption.
• Although not classified as a derivative, a credit-linked note has an embedded
derivative within it. The investor may not be aware of the embedded derivative and
the associated risk that this introduces into the transaction.
• The investor may also be exposed to basis risk. The investor holding the credit-
linked note may hedge the reference entity credit risk by shorting that reference entity
credit, by using a credit default swap or similar instrument. If there are mismatches
between the documentation in the credit-linked note and the hedging instrument, this
would give rise to a basis risk.
• The credit-linked note may be difficult to value as there is unlikely to be an active
market. In such circumstances, valuation models will be required which must take
account of credit exposure to both the issuer and the reference entity. Such models
require default data that might not be readily available.
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7 SYNTHETIC SECURITISATION
Just as the electronics industry was formed when the vacuum tubes were replaced by
transistors, and transistors were replaced by integrated circuits, the financial services
industry is being transformed now that securitised credit is beginning to replace
traditional lending (Kothari, 2002). According to Kothari (2002), securitisation will take
about 10 to 15 years to displace the classical lending system.
Securitisation is widely defined as carving out identifiable cash flow receivable from
financial assets (receivables) of the originator (who generates those assets) and selling the
right to receive those cash flows on to a new entity, typically a special purpose vehicle
(SPV) (Moore, 2000). According to Moore (2000), the Spy then issues the loan
securities and uses the cash flows to pay the interest payable on the loan securities. The
Spy is typically not owned by the originator and is therefore insulated from the
originator should the latter become insolvent so that the income rights are not affected.
Outside investors therefore feel comfortable about putting money into the Spy's
securities, as they know exactly the risk they are taking on, which does not include
originator risk (Moore 2000). According to Moore (2000), by isolating the assets from
the operational risks of the originating entity, the debt will invariably attract a higher
rating and hence lower interest cost than would have been the case if the originator had
raised the debt from it own balance sheet.
In analyzing the need for securitisation, Kothri (1996) states that financial markets
developed in response to the need to involve a large number of investors in the market
place. As the number of investors keeps on increasing, the average size per investor
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keeps on coming down. The small investor is not a professional investor. Hence he
needs an instrument which is easy to understand, and is liquid (Kothari, 1996). These
two needs set the stage for the evolution of financial instruments which would convert
financial claims into liquid, easy to understand and homogenous products. Thus,
securitisation in a generic sense is basic to the world of finance, and it is a truism to say
that securitisation envelopes the entire range of financial instruments, and hence, the
entire range of financial markets (Kothari, 1996).
According to Kothari (1996), credit derivatives are only a logical extension of the
concept of securitisation. Securitisation was premised on credit being converted to a
commodity. In the process, the risks inherent in credits were being professionally
managed and rated. In the second step, one would argue that if the risk can be measured
and traded as a commodity with the underlying financing involved, why can't the
financing and the credit be stripped as two different products? (Kothari, 1996). The
development of credit derivatives has not reduced the role for securitisation: it has only
increased the potential for securitisation. Credit derivatives are only a tool for risk
management: securitisation is both a tool for risk management and treasury management.
Entities that want to go for securitisation can easily use credit derivatives as a credit
enhancement device, that is, secure total returns from the portfolio by buying a
derivative, and then securities the portfolio (Kothari, 1996). The use of credit derivative
technology in securitisation is widely known as synthetic securitisation. These
structures are the preferred choice for banks seeking to manage regulatory and risk
capital, especially in Europe (Bund, 200 I). By some estimates, synthetic securitisation
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represents about 25 % of total European asset backed securities (ABS) volume in 2000,
and a similar portion of issuance in the US (Bund, 2001).
In terms of a guide written by Davies, Hewer and Rivett (2001), synthetic securitisation is
defined as a structured transaction in which the originating banks use credit derivatives to
transfer the risk of a specified pool of assets via a bankruptcy remote vehicle ("SPV") to
investors without actually selling the assets themselves. The pool of assets could be
loans, bonds, derivatives, lines of credit and/or illiquid securities. The transfer into the
Spy can be made using funded credit derivatives such as credit-linked notes and/or
unfunded credit derivatives such as credit default swaps and/or total return swaps.
Synthetic securitisation involves a transfer of risk and not a sale of the underlying pool of
assets (Davies/ Hewer/ Rivett, 2001).
In a synthetic securitisation, the originating bank transfers the risk relating to a pool of
assets, normally, to a Spy or some other legal entity using credit default swaps, total
return swaps or credit-linked notes. The investors purchase the notes issued by the SPY
and thereby assume the credit risk of the underlying pool of assets. The notes are issued
in various tranches, most of which are rated by the rating agencies. The greatest risk of
the underlying pool of assets is in the lower or unrated tranches of notes. The tranches
usually have a large range of expected maturities based on the risk profile of each
tranche. The proceeds from the notes are either used by the SPY to purchase collateral,
which is then given to the originating bank, or passed to the originating bank as
consideration for the credit-linked note (Davies/Hewer/Rivett, 2001).
The main difference between synthetic securitisation and a classic securitisation is that in
a synthetic securitisation only certain risks inherent in the assets are transferred rather
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than an outright sale of the assets themselves. The transfer could include both market and
credit risk or just credit risk depending on the type of credit derivative used to transfer
risk. In a classic securitisation, the assets are sold outright to the SPY and hence all risks
are transferred. Although there are many variations of a synthetic securitisation, there are
normally basic structures - full credit risk synthetic securitisation and leveraged credit
risk synthetic securitisation (Davies/ Hewer/ Rivett, 2001).
There are a number of reasons for using an SPY. These include:
• Creating a highly rated and bankruptcy remote vehicle for investors. This ring-fences
the transaction from the originating bank thereby protecting the investors in the event
the originating bank goes bankrupt.
• A mechanism for the originating bank to structure the tranches of notes to tailor the
return for different investors.
• A taxation benefit for the originating institution and/or the investor for issuing notes
out of an SPY rather than directly from the originating banle A key reason for the use
of an offshore SPY, for example, is that the "home" jurisdiction may have tax rules
under which there is a risk of re-characterisation or non-deductibility of cash flows
(Davies, Hewer, Rivett, 2001)
The originating bank will normally set up the SPY such that it is not a subsidiary or quasi
subsidiary and therefore any assets of the SPY are not consolidated onto the originating
bank's balance sheet.
The rating of the notes issued by the Spy will depend on the precise nature and structure
of the transaction, the credit quality of the underlying reference obligation and the tenor
and seniority of the notes issued. The originating bank will endeavour to ensure that the
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most senior notes issued by the Spy are AAA rated. If the credit-linked notes are used to
transfer the risk from the originating bank to the SPY, the Spy bears the credit ri~k of the
originating bank as well as that of the underlying reference assets. Ignoring any over
collaterisation or other credit enhancement techniques, the rating of the most senior
tranche of notes issued by the SPY will, in these circumstances, be subject to a rating cap
equal to the rating of the originating bank. According to Davies, Hewer and Rivett "it is
more common for credit default swaps to be used between the originating bank and the
Spy so the proceeds from the notes issued by the SPY to investors can be invested in
highly rated collateral. The rating of this collateral will then be limiting factor on the
rating of the notes issued by the SPY rather than the rating of the originating
bank"(2001). According to Davies, Hewer and Rivett (2001), there are basically two
types of synthetic securitisation structures, the basic full credit risk synthetic
securitisation and the leveraged credit risk synthetic securitisation structure.
Basicfull credit risk synthetic securitisation
In a basic full credit risk synthetic securitisation, the credit risk relating to an underlying
portfolio of assets is transferred in total to the SPY, and then on to the investors. The
originating bank can either enter into individual credit default swaps or credit-linked
notes with the SPY for each asset in the portfolio or a basket credit default swap or a
credit-linked note referenced to all assets in the reference portfolio. The SPY will issue a
number of tranches of notes to the investors. The different tranches provide different
levels of risk and return to the investors (Davies/ Hewer/Rivett, 2001). A typical full
credit risk synthetic securitisation structure using credit default swaps is depicted below.
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In this structure, the originating bank purchases protection from the SPY using credit
default swaps. The SPY then issues various tranches of notes to investors, each of which
has a different credit quality. The proceeds from the notes issued to the investors are
invested in highly rated securities, such as government securities, and these are then used
as collateral for the credit default swaps with the originating banle The premium on the
credit default swap and the coupon on the collateral securities provide the return to pay
the coupon on the notes issued to the investors.
FULL CREDIT RISK SYNTHETIC SECURITISATION
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In order to market the synthetic securitisation or to be more cost effective, the originating
bank may take on the risk of the first loss on the reference portfolio. The originating
bank may do this by either purchasing the lowest rated tranche of notes issued by the
Spy or by retaining the first loss on the reference portfolio so that the risk transferred to
the SPY is the second loss. There may also be an interest rate swap between the Spy and
the originating bank in order to produce the necessary cash flows for the investors.
According to Davies, Hewer and Rivett (2001), full credit risk synthetic securitisations
can be done without the use of an SPY. In this case, the originating bank issues a series
of credit-linked notes directly to the investors replicating the various tranches of notes
issued by the SPY. The originating bank therefore saves the cost of setting up and
managing the SPY.
Leveraged credit risk synthetic securitisation
A leveraged credit risk synthetic securitisation structure will transfer a percentage of the
risk on a credit portfolio to an Spy, as depicted below (Davies, Hewer, Rivett, 2001).
The size of the reference pool of assets to which the credit derivative between the
originating bank and the SPY is referenced is greater than the value of the notes issued by
the SPY. The originating bank will incur any credit losses over the level of protection in
the credit default swap.
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LEVERAGED SYNTHETIC SECURITISATION
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Due to the leveraged nature of the structure, the originating bank will normally buy
protection from the SPY using a credit default swap rather than a credit-linked note. The
credit default swaps are referenced to a portfolio of assets held by the originating bank.
The notional value of the protection bought by the originating bank from the SPY will be
the same as the notional value of the underlying credit portfolio. The credit default swap
used will only provide protection up to a set percentage of the notional amount.
The SPY issues tranches of notes to investors up to a value equal to the amount of risk
transferred under the credit default swap. The SPY buys government securities or some
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other fonn of low risk asset with the proceeds of the note. The Spy then pledges these
securities to the originating bank as collateral for the credit default swap (Davies, Hewer,
Rivett, 2001).
In order to obtain a regulatory capital benefit in most jurisdictions, the originating bank
will need to get approval from its regulators that the Spy is equivalent in credit standing
to an OECD bank (Davies, Hewer, Rivett, 2001). If the regulator agrees that the SPY is
equivalent to an OECD bank, the originating bank will be able to substitute a 20% risk
weighting instead of a 100% risk weighting.
The authors go on to state that the coupon on the notes issued by the SPY will depend
principally on the credit rating of each tranche. The rating agencies will detennine the
rating on each tranche of notes by reference to the credit quality of the assets in the
reference portfolio, the structure and size of the various tranches of notes and their tenor.
This will be monitored and reviewed by the rating agencies on a regular basis. The
coupon will compensate the investor for taking on the risk implicit in that tranche of
notes. The lower rated tranches will have a higher coupon reflecting the greater credit
risk in the lower tranches of notes (Davies, Hewer, Rivett, 2001).
The credit derivative between the originating bank and the SPY, normally a credit default
swap or potentially a credit-linked note, will specify the relevant credit events which will
nonnally be based on the standard ISDA definitions.
Settlement between the SPY and the originating bank can occur immediately following a
credit event or can be deferred until the stated maturity of a particular tranche of notes
issued by the SPV. If credit default swaps have been used to transfer the credit risk from
the originating bank to the SPV, then on occurrence of a credit event on one of the assets
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in the reference portfolio, collateral will normally be sold to fund the payments required
under the credit default swap to the originating bank. Following a credit ev~nt, the
market value of the lower rated tranche will fall, the size of the fall being dependent on
the precise redemption mechanics of the issued tranches. To fund the redemption at
maturity of the notes issued by the SPV, the remaining collateral will be sold by the SPV.
The highest rated notes will be redeemed first, then each subsequent tranche through to
the lowest or unrated notes (Davies, Hewer, Rivett, 2001).
If credit-linked notes have been used to transfer the credit risk from the originating bank
to the Spy then normally these credit-linked notes will not redeem on the occurrence of a
credit event but at the designated maturity of the credit-linked note. This will be
designed to match the maturity of the tranches of notes issued by the SPV. The amount
received by the Spy from the originating bank on redemption of the credit-linked notes
will be distributed to the holders ofthe notes in order of seniority.
Davies, Hewer, Rivett (2001) lists the following benefits, risks and advantages that
accrue to both the bank and the investor in the securitised instruments:
Benefits for the originating bank specific to full credit risk synthetic securitisation
• The originating bank has purchased protection on the pool of the reference credits
and has hence transferred all the credit risk on the specified portfolio of assets to
the SPY.
• If the credit risk is transferred to the SPY using credit-linked notes then normally,
providing the originating bank allocates the proceeds it receives from the notes as
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collateral against the reference credits it owns, the originating bank may obtain a
low or zero regulatory capital charge against those assets.
• If the credit is transferred using a credit default swap, the originating bank may
obtain a reduced capital regulatory charge on the underlying exposure provided
the credit default swap meets the required regulatory conditions.
Benefits for the originating bank specific to leveraged credit risk synthetic
securitisation
• The originating bank buys protection on a percentage of loss on the reference
portfolio rather than on the whole of the reference portfolio, and, therefore, dependent
on the level of the protection purchased, it may be more cost effective than
purchasing protection on the whole reference portfolio.
• For leveraged synthetic securitisations, based on the calculation of expected loss on
the reference portfolio and the amount of credit risk transferred to the SPV, the
originating bank can get protection on a much larger reference portfolio. As the
originating bank knows all the assets in the portfolio are very unlikely to default, it
can therefore get effective protection by issuing a smaller percentage of this value in
notes from the SPV. As significantly less notes need to be issued, the process should
be easier because not so many investors need to be found.
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Benefits to tlte investor
Generic benefits to tlte investor
• The investor is able to access risks associated with asset classes it would not normally
have access to without having to transact any complex trades, as the investor acquires
loan notes. For example, investment funds can obtain risk exposures and returns
based on the credit risk of a loan portfolio.
• The investor has the operational advantage of not having to record, monitor or collect
interest and principal in respect of all the underlying reference assets
• The investor can purchase notes with the risk and reward profile suited to their needs
by purchasing different tranches of notes issued by the SPV.
• The investor is normally able to obtain an enhanced yield, compared to classic
securitisation with similar notes, due to the reduced transaction costs.
• The investor does not have a direct credit exposure to the originating bank, rather to
the rated notes issued by the SPV. Where credit default swaps are used, the rating of
the notes is influenced by the fact that the proceeds from the notes are used to
purchase government bonds, which are often used as collateral for credit default
swaps with the originating bank. Where credit-linked notes are used or the funds are
lent to the originating bank, the rating of the notes issued by the SPY will normally be
limited to the credit rating of the originating bank.
• Synthetic securitisation can be used to provide the investor with a portfolio risk
exposure without requiring the investor to establish relationships with the individual
customers to whom the assets relate. Similarly, the investor does not have to
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purchase the underlying assets, which may be prohibitive due to tax or regulatory
reasons
• Where the transaction accompanies substitution, the investor is exposed to a lower
level of prepayment risk.
Benefits to the investor specific to leveraged credit risk synthetic securitisation
• The leverage in a leveraged credit risk securitisation structure concentrates the credit
risk in the Spy and therefore the returns on the notes issued by the SPY to the
investors are greater to compensate for the increased risk.
Risks to the originating bank
• Synthetic securitisation can have large notional values and normally involve a large
number of assets in the reference portfolio. This can create significant operational
risks within the organisation unless an operationally robust framework exists.
• The originating bank may not achieve a complete transfer of the reference portfolio's
risk to the SPV. This may occur where there is a mismatch of terms between the
credit derivative and the asset in the reference portfolio. This could be a difference
between the covenants in a loan document and the credit events in the credit default
swap. There could also be differences in the maturity of the numerous underlying
assets and that of the credit derivative.
• The SPY may have to be consolidated into the balance sheet of the originating bank.
This would mean that all the assets and liabilities of the SPY are consolidated. This
could potentially defeat the object of setting up an Spy and may result in capital and
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regulatory ratios for the originating bank being adversely affected. The originating
bank must make sure that the SPY does not fall foul of the accounting guidelines,
which are likely to be based around control and by reference to the risks and rewards
associated with the assets in the SPY.
• Where the originating bank sells the collateral to the SPV, the assets may not be
deemed to have been sold under the accounting rules and therefore may remain on the
originating bank's balance sheet. The issue of a "true sale" may also be impacted
where the originating bank manages the collateral for a fee dependant on the
performance or is able to substitute securities in and out of the collateral pool.
• There is reputational risk for the originating bank should one of the structures that it
has set up collapses.
Risks to the investor
• The investor is exposed to the credit risk of the reference credits and potentially the
risk of default by the originating bank depending on the structure of the transaction.
The investor would be exposed to the credit risk of the originating bank if the
transaction between the SPY and the originating bank is funded, using credit-linked
notes, and the originating bank is not able to repay the principal on maturity.
• The exposure to the credit risk of the underlying pool of assets is concentrated in the
lower rated tranches of the notes issued by the SPV. If the transaction is a leveraged
credit risk synthetic securitisation, the credit risk of the reference portfolio is already
concentrated in the SPV. A first percentage of the losses relating to a much larger
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reference portfolio will have been transferred into the Spy and this will then be
"super" concentrated in the lowest rated tranches of notes issued by the SPV.
• There may not be a liquid secondary market for the notes issued by the SPV.
• The notes may be redeemable on the occurrence of a credit event, which may be
before the designated maturity of the notes
• There may be insufficient due diligence undertaken on the assets which are included
in the reference portfolio
• Loans may be incorrectly substituted into the reference portfolio thereby worsening
the credit risk of the reference portfolio. Similarly, assets may be correctly
substituted into the reference pool to increase the yield, which may also increases the
credit risk in the reference pool.
• Where collateral is posted by the SPY with the originating bank, the investor is at risk
that the collateral may be misappropriated.
• The rated notes issued by the SPY may be difficult to value, as there is unlikely to be
an active market. In such circumstances, the notes will be valued according to their
rating using an equivalent benchmark price for notes of that rating.
• Any unrated notes issued by the SPY may also be difficult to value due to the lack of
an active market. In such circumstances, valuation models will be required which
must take account of credit exposure to all the underlying reference entities to which
the SPY is exposed. Such models require default data that may not be readily
available.
The use of synthetic structures and credit derivatives will only increase as more financial
institutions and corporations shift from passive to active management of credit risk in all
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forms (Bund, 2001). Recent synthetic structures executed in the US and Europe have
allowed banks to credit enhance and sell first loss equity exposure to a pool of credits by
extending a sub participation of interest from the entire reference portfolio.
In South Africa, the first synthetic securitisation structure was set up by Rand Merchant
Bank (RMB), when it created a new asset class locally by structuring a R 12.5 billion
synthetic CLO - called Fresco - from a portion of parent FirstRand and bought protection
- via a credit default swap with a Spy - consisted of advances to 107 mainly South
African companies with 96% of the portfolio commanding investment grade ratings and
an average of A+. The portfolio was highly diversified among different industries. In
terms of the structure, FirstRand bought back R 11.25 billion of the AAA-rated loans via
a super senior portfolio COS. It then issued the remaining R 1.082 billion in bonds
divided into six tranches, five with credit ratings ranging from AAA to BB. These bonds,
all listed on the Bond Exchange of SA, were snapped up by institutional investors and
were 1.8 times over-subscribed. The sixth unrated tranche totaling R 168 million was
taken up by RMB itself. FirstRand says it opted for the transaction partly because it was
more efficient for freeing up capital than raising new capital in the local debt or equity
markets, and released additional capacity for it to make further loans to the underlying
companies.
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8 THE IMPACT OF ENRON
In the immediate aftermath of the downfall of US energy giant, Enron, questions began to
be asked about how this would impact on the credit derivatives market. Standard and
Poor (S&P) estimated the number of credit derivative transactions that Enron appeared in
could be in the region of 3.3 billion pounds (Futures and Option World, 2002).
"Although much attention had been focused on Enron in relation to loan exposures, the
energy sector and the commodities market, it was also a named source of credit risk in
many credit derivative transactions," explains Nik Khaki, director of the S&P's
structured finance derivatives group" (FOW, 2002). "In addition, Enron had an overall
derivatives strategy that included credit derivatives. Thus Enron was not only a source
of credit risk in derivatives transactions, it was a source of risk to the derivatives
transactions" (FOW, 2002).
Traders believe that Enron's collapse has and will continue to have positive implications
for the credit derivatives market for two reasons. Firstly, it has highlighted the potential
dangers of counter party and supplier credit risk and will, therefore, encourage more
companies into the credit derivatives market (FOW, 2002). Secondly, the Enron example
clearly shows that the market is a key-leading indicator. Research by online credit
derivatives broker, CreditTrade, illustrates how credit derivative swap spreads were much
wider than asset swap spreads. In analyzing the immediate implications of Enron's
demise, CreditTrade concluded that:
• Credit default swaps provided an important hedging tool for worsening Enron
credit
54
• There has been a more efficient loan/bond portfolio management
• Credit default swaps are a vital leading indicator across a broad spectrum of
market activities.
In addition, S&P notes that, in December 2000, Enron began acting as the counter
party in swap transactions without also being the reference entity. As such, the
counter parties were vulnerable to potential default by Enron as a counter party, even
if it was not a reference source of credit exposure in a transaction. "In these
transactions, any default by Enron as counter party under the swap contract would
initiate a process whereby termination of the swap contract is possible," says
Khakee. "The non-defaulting counter party would have the option to replace Enron
with a new counter party in the swaps. This could be done on the whole swap
notional amount of credit exposure or the portfolio could be carved up into pieces in
order to distribute the risk across various counter parties".
Additionally, Enron's default has had a significant impact on synthetic securitisation
issues. S&P has lowered its rating on several of these transactions. In their report,
Goldman Sach's Reyman and Marx state" The liquidity of the Enron name in the
credit default swap market made Enron an easy addition to synthetic portfolios"
(FOW, 2002). Reyman and Marx conclude that Enron's collapse could be positive
for the investment grade synthetic market: " First, Enron provided a dramatic
demonstration of counter party and supplier credit risk to non-financial companies,
who are now more likely to become active users of credit derivatives markets. The
increase in single name credit risk hedging will, in turn, spur synthetic issuance
(FOW,2002). Second, credit investors have once again witnessed the benefit of first
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loss protection offered by mezzamne and semor synthetic issues. A portfolio
manager who owned Enron debt outright has suffered a visible credit loss. Investors
who had Enron exposure through a synthetic mezzanine or senior class will, in most
circumstances not suffered more than a rating downgrade (FOW, 2002).
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9 CREDIT DERIVATIVE PRICING AND MODELING
The rapid development of the market for credit derivatives has prompted increasing focus
on the modeling of credit risk (Das, 2000). This is in part predicated upon the necessity
of pricing credit derivative transactions, but also because at a more fundamental level an
understanding of the value dynamics of credit risk is inevitably a precursor to effectively
applying credit derivatives to the management of credit risk and credit portfolios (Das,
2000).
This interest has led to increasing interest in credit and default risk modeling which has
manifested itself in significant increases in the volume of academic literature and the
release of products such as CreditMetrics and CreditRisk+. In practice however, pricing
of credit risk remains driven by the pricing of debt securities in the capital markets.
In an analysis of the pricing issues surrounding the ongoing development of credit
derivatives internationally, Kumar (2001) argues that protection against specific credit
risk is still hard to find at the right price and at the right time. Until the market is liquid
and competitively priced, companies will often prefer not to hedge credit risks or may opt
for traditional cover such as credit insurance, bank guarantees, factoring or state
guarantees. According to Kumar (2001), non-financial firms are extremely reluctant to
payout any kind of money for any kind of hedge. Credit default swaps, for example, are
often more expensive than letters of credit. But, as Kumar (2001) argues, this is often
because credit derivatives are not priced accurately. However, insurance and capital
markets are converging, and credit is increasingly priced in the credit default market.
Kumar (2001) argues that as a result such inefficiencies should disappear. The bankers
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are waiting for two things: for credit default spreads to narrow, and for stock market
investors to start recognizing the value of companies actively managing their credit risk
with hedges.
According to Kumar (2001), the problem is that the evolution internationally of the credit
default swap has not been smooth and logical. Kumar cites a derivatives trader "interest
in credit protection comes sporadically and it comes with market crises. It spiked after
the Russian and Asian crises, and it has spiked again with the downgrade of the telecoms
companies. But that interest comes too late for the markets concerned because protection
prices have already widened too far."
Liquidity in the credit derivatives market has improved substantially, and it now easy to
place transactions worth $ 500 million or more. This, however, is true primarily of major
names that are generally listed. Unrated companies or those rated below investment
grade remain illiquid, says Paulo Gribaudi, a managing director who heads global credit
derivatives at IntesaBc in Milan, and these are precisely the kind of companies that most
buyers of credit protection are exposed to. Internationally, however, some industries
including the telecoms industries may have no choice but to go down the credit derivative
route despite the expensive price tags, if only to improve their declining credit ratings or
obtain further financing (Kumar, 2001). Most international banks and investors may
become lenient to companies willing to hedge their credit exposures. "Having an actively
traded credit derivatives market for a certain name improves liquidity for the issuer. The
kinds of products that can be issued vary greatly in such a situation", says Kumar (2001).
She goes on to state, "credit risk is not standardized in the way it is confirmed and
written. Sometimes it is does not lend itself to being hedged. The exposure a company
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has with a counter party is not a bond or a loan. These are standard in the credit
derivatives market. So, if there is a default, you have a mismatch. If you want to fully
hedge the exposure, they need a different contract from the credit derivatives floor
business. So it becomes very expensive."
Despite the problems in the pricing of credit derivatives, most foreign investment bankers
are bullish about the potential for credit derivatives. According to Deutsche Bank's
Stonberg (2001), the deteriorating credit environment in the US and in some sectors in
Europe may accelerate the process of resolving the pricing issues in credit derivatives.
He states that " from a prudent perspective, companies from these environments should
either hedge their exposure, or use the market as a pricing point to make sure they are
pricing credit risk the right way in their contracts" (2001).
Ultimately, it will be a cost return trade off and credit derivatives will have to compete
with established rivals, such as state export guarantees.
The value of a credit derivative is derived largely by the market price of the underlying
credit-worthiness of the borrower. As in the cash market, the credit derivative industry
uses credit spreads to express the price of the credit risk in products such as credit default
swaps. Credit spreads represent the difference between the yield on company debts and
the risk free interest rate of the same maturity. The price of credit risk cannot be easily
observed in the market place unlike the underlying prices of interest rate derivatives.
The credit risk implicit in all credit-linked products depends on two major factors: the
probability that the issuer may default and the expected recovery in the event such default
occurs. In general, the greater the likelihood of default and the smaller the expected
recovery rate, the larger the credit risk to the investor and hence a larger credit spread is
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demanded in the market place. An efficient market for credit requires sufficient and
transparent information on these factors to facilitate an effective evaluation of the credit
risk of the underlying reference asset. Because a cash credit product and related credit
default swap are exposed to the same underlying credit risk, the pricing methodology for
credit derivatives is closely linked to that used in the cash market. In particular, the large
informational requirements and complexity of issuer specific credit analysis associated
with the pricing of credit risk for cash credit products also applies for credit derivative
products (Das, 2000).
According to Das (2000), internationally, there are two broad categories of products
developed to price credit derivatives. These are the "structural models" and "intensity
models". Structural models, also known as the "Merton" approach, seek to predict the
timing of default and hence quantify the appropriate credit spread by utilizing a large
number of market inputs such as financial information and the credit rating of a specific
issuer, together with industry and macro-economic variables. Such models assume a
constant recovery ratio that is based on historical performance. Pricing should also
reflect the distribution of the reference assets' potential future credit quality. Credit
rating agencies periodically produce "transition matrices" which compute the future
credit distribution of the various rating categories by quantifying the historical
probabilities of an issuer being downgraded or defaulting before a given date in the
future. The Merton based models implicitly incorporate such information in the pricing
of credit spread.
The Intensity models, on the other hand, explicitly employ such transition matrices to
predict the default probabilities in order to price credit (Das, 2000).
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The Merton Approach
In the first class of models ("Structural models"), a credit product is regarded as a
contingent claim on the assets of the issuer and is valued according to option pricing
theory. Merton produced the first academic model in this class in 1974. Merton
observed that corporate issuers have the option to default and will probably exercise it
should the firm's assets fall below the face value of the debt. The model relies heavily on
the assumption that there is a strong relationship between credit risk and the price of
equity. The time period to a potential default is determined by tracking the value of the
underlying reference credit under various assumptions and is assumed to occur when this
process meets a predetermine boundary. In its simplest form, the methodology prices
credit risk as a deep-out-of-the-money put option on the assets of the firm with a strike
price equal to the predetermined boundary. Most pricing methodologies derived from the
Merton approach are complex and require many technical indicators. For example, such
models utilize the fact that the volatility of default rates and loss rates are higher for
lower rating categories. This implies that investors in lower rated debt must not only be
compensated for a higher level of credit risk but also for a greater degree of certainty over
the level of credit risk. To the extent that this approach to pricing can be applied to credit
derivatives, it can also be applied to the pricing of any traditional credit instrument. The





Historical default and recovery rates
Financial and accounting information
Macro-economic indicators relating to a specific country or geographical region; and
Statistical estimates, e.g. volatility of the stock price
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The Intensity Models
This model measures the potential time of default using the historical transition matrices
produced by credit rating agencies and credit spreads observed in the market place. The
models involve the calibration of default probabilities to the observed credit spreads by
usually assuming a constant historical recovery ratio. The model does not directly use the
firm's underlying assets to model the time of default, as in the Merton approach
described above, but this is indirectly taken into account by incorporating the finn's
credit rating. With any credit-linked product, the primary risk lies in the potential default
of reference entity: absent any default in the reference entity, the expected cash flows will
be received in full, whereas if a default occurs, the investor will receive a reduced amount
only. It is therefore possible to model a risky cash flow as a portfolio of contingent cash
flows corresponding to the different default scenarios weighted by the probability of
default and making assumptions on recovery ratios. The computed risk neutral
probabilities can then be used to estimate the forward credit risk implied by the market
and, in a consistent framework, price more complex derivatives such as credit spread
options. Internationally, market practitioners often calculate the probability of default
from credit spreads quoted in the market.
According to Das (2000), there are a number of issues in employing credit spreads to
compute the default probability:
• Obtain a tenn structure of credit spreads can be a difficult exercise because, even
for the most liquid underlying reference assets, only a few quotes exist on the
credit tenn structure. The quoted spreads for the same underlying and with the
same maturity differ but this difference tends to be small and the spreads are
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usually tight under normal market conditions. For reference assets with low
rating or non-investment grade assets, pricing quotes either do not exist or
whatever quotes are available in the market place they are purely indicative in
nature and vary significantly. Credit derivative practitioners are therefore forced
to price credit risk using proxy credit spreads
• There are many different credit spreads that are used to price credit risk. Some
practitioners prefer to use credit default spreads, others use asset swap spreads,
others use spreads implied from quoted bond prices and some use a combination
of whatever spreads are available in the market. When valuing a credit derivative
using the credit spread of another asset, an assumption must be made on the
correlation between the two markets. For example, if asset swap spreads are used
as a proxy to price credit default swaps they are adjusted assuming a certain
degree of correlation between the two markets. The level of correlation assumed
varies between market participants.
• Where there are no credit spread quotes across different maturities, interpolation
and extrapolation techniques are employed to value the credit derivative.
Practitioners make different assumptions to apply these techniques with the result
that the interpolated and extrapolated spreads generated can vary considerably.
• The nature of credit derivative contracts as a result of different clauses in the
documentation will affect credit spreads. For example, in the US, effectively two
different credit curves are used for a credit derivative; one based on a credit
derivative with a restructuring clause and another credit curve used for a credit
derivative without a restructuring clause
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There are a number of other factors that affect the credit spreads and hence the calculated
probability of default. The factors are as follows:
• The liquidity of both the underlying reference entity and other relevant markets.
For example, to hedge the credit derivative, the most effective hedge is likely to
be in a credit derivative market. It may also be possible, however, to obtain a
hedge in the bond, loan, asset swap or other market. These markets may be more
or less liquid than the credit derivative market.
• Different sensitivities to systemic risk in the reference entity. For example, a
bank with a highly concentrated exposure to a country is likely to quote a
different spread to a bank without a concentration exposure
• Depression scenarios. These are hypothetical default simulations much worse
than the default suggested by historical data
• Individual views on future uncertainties. In volatile markets, traders may overrule
the price produced by a model normally employed by the bank to price credit risk.
• Appetite for risk. Banks that have a strong appetite for risk will be prepared to
quote more aggressive prices compared to banks which are more sensitive.
• Costs of transacting trades. As credit derivatives are a relatively new business,
the fixed costs associated with doing business vary significantly between different
banks. In general, the cost base of the bank will be reflected in the spreads it
quotes.
• Correlation between the reference entity and the counter party. Different banks
have different methodologies for evaluating the correlation between the
probability of default of the counter party and the reference entity.
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•
According to Das (2000), there are a number of key pricing issues. The features of credit
derivatives expose investors to risks other than "pure" credit risk and these should, in
theory, impact the pricing. For instance, the potential payment under a credit derivative
is determined by reference to the occurrence of credit events in the reference obligation
or portfolio. The broader the definition of credit events in the contract, the greater the
risk. The accurate pricing of credit derivatives must capture this and other specific risk
characteristics of each contract. The numerous assumptions and historical data used in
the models, however, arguably fail to capture some of these. Some of the practical
difficulties are as follows:
• The ISDA Credit Derivatives Definitions list SiX credit events that may be.
incorporated in a credit default swap. These credit events differ from the definition of
default used by credit rating agencies such as Moody's and S&P
• The use of ISDA's definitions of credit events may lead to a credit derivative payout
following an event that actually does not constitute an actual default. This should
affect the pricing of credit derivatives since it affects their effectiveness as hedging
instruments.
• Despite ISDA's efforts to standardize product documentation for credit default swaps;
the contracts are far from achieving the level of standardization experienced in other
derivative markets. Documentation risk therefore remains a key issue in the pricing
of credit derivatives
The practical problem relating to the separation of pure credit risk from liquidity risk
when pricing conventional risky products also apply to credit derivative products
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In summary, despite the rigour that has been introduced to credit derivative pricing, not
all credit pricing is a science; there are a number of factors preventing market participants
from relying exclusively on models to price credit derivatives. An important obstacle is
the lack of reliable risky bond prices on which to calibrate the term structure of default
intensities. Because of low market liquidity, many market bond quotes reflect one-way
prices. Without a liquid market to facilitate price discovery, owners of debt may be
better informed about its riskiness, creating an information advantage over sellers of
credit protection. As a result, sellers of credit protection face the risk of adverse selection
of more risky default swaps, and of under pricing swap premiums. Because of the
uncertainty about the risks that determine credit pricing, the market practice has been to
add additional risk premiums to the default swap premium in order to compensate for the
unknown risks. Despite their current limitations, credit derivative pricing models play an
important role in creating pricing transparency. In turn, greater transparency attracts
more market participants and therefore creates more liquidity. Therefore pricing models
are an essential link in the liquidity circle.
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10 LEGAL DOCUMENTATION
In an article written by Kohler and Cocco (Futures and Option World, 2001), the latest
documentary issues surrounding credit derivatives were examined. In particular, the
foundation of the vast majority of credit derivative documentation, the 1999 International
Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) Credit Derivative Definitions, pointing out
some of the documentation's key features, was examined. ISDA is an industry trade
group that collaborated on the first interest rate swaps master agreement and has
developed most of the standard documentation in the derivatives industry. ISDA has a
task force that is developing standard documents for credit derivatives.
According to Kohler and Cocco (2001), the definitions are a set of contractual provisions
that can be incorporated by reference into confirmations relating to credit derivatives that
take the form of a single name default swap. This allows parties to the transaction to use
a short form of confirmation containing only the economic and deal specific terms
relating to that transaction. The objective of the structure is to provide market
participants with a tool for producing documentation that is sufficiently sophisticated to
deal with the majority of issues arising from such transactions, simple enough to facilitate
rapid processing, and cost effective. As with all ISDA documentation, the definitions
allow for numerous electives to be made by the parties, and the parties are also free to
make whatever amendments or additions they agree by inclusion in the confirmation of
the appropriate language. Kohler (2001) says that the definitions also provide for a
number of fallbacks to apply in case the parties do not specify otherwise. Accordingly,
market participants recognize the particularly important role of documentation in the
credit derivatives market. As a consequence of the Russian and Asian financial crises,
67
Kohler and Cocco (2001) comment that, especially in the case of credit derivatives, the
payment of large sums of money depends critically on the wording of a specific clause.
According to Kohler and Cocco (2001), the 1999 ISDA Credit derivative definitions also
apply to credit default swaps relating to obligations for the payment of money by a
reference entity. With appropriate modifications, the definitions can also be used to
document credit derivative transactions that refer to baskets of reference entities, or to
form the basis of documents relating to funded products. In a transaction, the party
buying credit risk protection, or buyer, undertakes to pay the seller of protection a
predetermined amount. In return the seller undertakes to make a payment in favour of the
buyer in case the defined credit events occur. According to Kohler and Cocco (2001),
credit events serve as indicators of the deterioration of the credit worthiness of the
reference entity. One of the main characteristics of a credit derivative is that the buyer
does not have to suffer a loss as a result of a credit event in order to qualify for the
payment from the seller. To illustrate, Kohler and Cocco (2001) provide an example as
follows: A buys from B the right to receive from B a payment of $10 million in case
company X undergoes bankruptcy proceedings or loan Y is not repaid. The occurrence
of one of these events, in circumstances involving the satisfaction of any other condition to
payment that the parties may have specified in the transaction, would give A the right to
receive from B the agreed payment, irrespective of whether A had any credit exposure to
company X or loan y. In terms of the article, this feature is of crucial importance to the
determination of the regulatory environment applicable to credit derivatives. Kohler and
Cocco (2001) comment that in the UK, if entering into credit derivatives constituted the
carrying on of insurance business, there would be a requirement for authorization under
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the Insurance Companies Act 1982. The fact that a buyer of a credit derivative does not
have to hold the obligations in question in order to obtain a payment from the seller
means that the credit derivative does not fall within the scope of this legislation. This
analysis was set out in full in a legal opinion obtained by ISDA in 1997.
In terms of the article, it is essential that a reference entity be identified with sufficient
precIsion. For example, to what extent are successors or affiliates of an entity to be
included? This point, in the view of Kohler and Cocco (2001), is particularly important
when dealing with a sovereign.
In the view of Kohler and Cocco (2001), the issue of the specification of the credit event
is also critically important. The buyer and seller may buy and sell credit risk defined by
reference to different types of credit events. Accordingly, it is appropriate that both
select carefully the type of event on which they wish to trade. The definitions offer a
menu that comprises (1) failure to pay, (2) acceleration or default, (3) repudiation, (4)
restructuring and (5) the bankruptcy of the reference entity. In the case of all but last of
these, the parties can choose to implement a type of materiality threshold by agreeing a
payment requirement or default requirement that has to be crossed before the credit event
is deemed to have occurred. The parties may consider the definition's menu to be in need
of amendment or supplement in order to deal with the specific credit risk they wish to
trade. The article provides an example as follows: the bankruptcy credit event focuses on
events that corporate obligors could experience and would require tailoring if the
reference entity were to take some other legal form.
The article further states that the definition of restructuring was one of the most
controversial provisions in the drafting process that led to the definitions. In the
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forerunner of the definitions, ISDA's 1998 long form of confirmation, restructuring was
defined by reference to events that had the effect of making the terms of the relevant
obligation materially less favourable from an economic, credit or risk perspective. This
definition was considered to be too subjective, and had given rise to a number of
disputes. According to Kohler and Cocco (2001), the new definition now refers to more
objective criteria, such as the reduction in the amount of principal or premium. A degree
of subjectivity is, however, retained in that the events that would otherwise fall within the
definition of restructuring do not constitute a restructuring if they do not result directly or
indirectly from deterioration in the credit worthiness or financial condition of the
reference entity. However, according to the article, the market's disquiet (the
international market) regarding restructuring was not quelled by these changes, and this
recently gave rise to ISDA publishing a Restructuring Supplement. The supplement
restricts the types of obligation to which restructuring can apply. It clarifies issues that
the definitions were not clear on and places certain additional parameters on the ways in
which a transaction can settle following a restructuring credit event.
Apart from the bankruptcy of the reference entity, Kohler and Cocco (2001) state that the
question of whether a credit event has occurred is determined by reference to obligations
identified in the confirmation. The definitions introduce a matrix system based on the
choice of one obligation category, and, if appropriate, one or more obligation categories.
The aim of this structure is to introduce flexibility into the documentation process. The
obligation categories are as follows: payment, borrowed money, reference obligations
only, bond, loan, or loan. According to Kohler and Cocco (2001), it is possible to give a
very wide definition of obligations by selecting payment. On the other hand it is possible
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to specify that credit events are only relevant if they occur with reference to only one
obligation, the reference obligation. Choosing one or more obligation characteristics has
the effect of restricting the field of obligations in relation to which a credit event may
occur, if it occurs in relation to obligations of the chosen category, and which have the
chosen characteristics.
In addition, the article points out that the fact that a credit event has occurred is not
sufficient to trigger the payment of credit protection. Before that can occur, certain
conditions to payment must be satisfied. The definitions set out three conditions
involving the service of notice. A credit event notice must be served in any transaction
before the credit protection will become payable. The parties may choose that a notice of
publicly available information must be served to cite new sources that confirm the
occurrence of a credit event. Finally, if the transaction is to settle physically, the buyer
must serve a notice of intended physical settlement.
A credit event notice must refer to a credit event that occurs during the term of the
transaction. According to Kohler and Cocco (2001), the term begins on the effective date
and ends on the scheduled termination date, both of which are agreed by the parties in the
confirmation. However, where the credit event is a failure to pay, the credit event must
be continuing at the end of any applicable grace period or three days, whichever is the
longer. According to Kohler and Cocco (2001), this requirement is intended to avoid a
credit event being triggered by a technical default, but it means that a default could have
occurred on or before the scheduled termination date, even though the grace period is
pending at that time. The definitions provide that the parties have two options in these
circumstances. They may either postpone the end of the term of the transaction beyond
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the scheduled termination date to the end of the grace period, at which point, if the failure
to pay is continuing, a credit event notice may be served. Alternatively, they may agree
that the grace period must have expired before the scheduled termination date or no credit
event notice may be served. The latter, in terms of the article, is the fallback provision,
which applies unless the parties agree otherwise.
In terms of the article, the parties agree at the outset whether cash settlement or physical
settlement applies to the relevant credit derivative transaction. These are different means
of realizing the protection bought by the buyer where a credit event actually occurs. If
cash settlement applies, the payment to be made by the seller to the buyer may be an
amount fixed in advance or, more usually, an amount to reflect the drop in value of
reference obligation as determined by way of a dealer's poll. In the case of physical
settlement, the buyer will deliver to the seller certain types of obligations- deliverable
obligations - against payment of a fixed amount, usually the face value of those
obligations.
The buyer realizes its protection because it delivers to the seller assets that are worth less
than their face value, but obtains payment of full face value from the seller. Physical
settlement is usually used in the market place, because it avoids having to determine the
exact market value of the relevant obligation, and in circumstances where the credit event
actually occurs it may be difficult to assess the drop in the value of the reference
obligation for the purpose of cash settlement. On the other hand, some buyers may prefer
cash settlement because if the buyer has selected physical settlement and is unable to
obtain suitable deliverable obligations to deliver due to, for instance, a squeeze of
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liquidity in the market, the buyer may lose some or all of the protection it had under the
credit derivative.
Deliverable obligations are defined, as is the case for obligations, by choosing one
deliverable obligation category and any relevant deliverable obligation characteristic.
Although they are defined in the same way, obligations and deliverable obligations play
different roles. Whereas obligations are what parties refer to in order to assess whether a
credit event has occurred, deliverable obligations come into play only as a settlement tool
and if the parties have specified that physical settlement apply. The two do not need to
be the same.
Future Developments
According to Kohler and Cocco (2001), ISDA is currently working on producing dispute
resolution guidelines. It is also preparing user guidelines to the definitions. A goal in the
future is to expand the definitions to govern more types of credit derivatives.
Assembling market consensus support for such developments has proved tricky,
according to Kohler. As a result, ISDA has recently introduced a new approach to the
compilation of standard documentation involving the inauguration of a small working
party to make recommendations to the rest of the market. This working party, nicknamed
the 0'/" comprises institutions representing constituencies on both sides of the Atlantic
and different parts of the market. According to Kohler and Cocco (2001), the agenda it
has set itself includes a review of other parts of the definitions including the bankruptcy,
repudiation, acceleration and default credit events, language for zero coupon bonds and
convertible bonds, and a clarification of the successor definition, with a view to
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producing further supplements or guidance as to what constitutes the market standard on
various issues. Developments expected to be implemented in the coming months will
show whether the 06 approach is more efficient than the previous approach. The authors
finally conclude that credit derivatives will continue to grow and expand. These
developments will mean that refining the definitions is a continuing process that will
inspire fierce debate.
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11 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY, PROBLEM STATEMENT AND
HYPOTHESIS
The objective of the study is to research the building blocks of credit derivatives in
general and then to determine whether there is scope to apply it in the South African
context.
11.1. The Problem Statement
There is a need to investigate the extent to which credit derivatives can be applied in
South Africa in the context of an illiquid corporate bond market, and what, if any,
obstacles stand in the way of implementing credit derivatives successfully.
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12. THE RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
12.1. Sampling and Sampling Technique
The sampling frame is the current practitioners of credit derivatives in South Africa.
Currently, there are four local banks trading credit derivatives- Standard Corporate and
Merchant Bank, ABSA, NIB and Investee.
12.2. Design and Analytic Technique
The research design is essentially an Exploratory Design, being primarily qualitative in
nature. Information has been collected using the Communication Study approach. In
particular, questionnaires have been utilized in the information gathering process.
12.3 Method of Data Collection
In order to collect information on the application of credit derivatives in South Africa, a
two-step process has been followed. Firstly, secondary sources have been researched
fully. This includes periodicals, journals, and articles written by the established
authorities in the field.
Secondly, an open-ended questionnaire was distributed to the major participants in the
credit derivatives in South Africa, highlighting critical issues that require clarification.
The following questions have been asked in the questionnaire:
1. In your estimation, what is the size of the current credit derivative market in
South Africa?
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2. What, in your view, is the most frequently used credit derivative instrument in the
South African market?
3. What are the most common uses for credit derivatives in South Africa?
4. The South African Reserve Bank has recently proposed substantial amendments
to the existing banking regulations to enable the practice of credit derivatives in
South Africa. What are the most significant issues arising from the proposals that
stand out, in your view?
5. What pricing model does your institution employ in determining the appropriate
price of a credit derivative instrument? Are they any shortcomings in the pricing
model chosen?
6. Does your institution employ the same model to price all credit derivative
instruments?
7. In view of the fact that credit derivatives are in its infancy in South Africa, what
are the particular pricing challenges, if any, that your institution faces?
8. Synthetic securitisation is widely believed to be the preferred model for
securitisation in the future. Do you agree with this statement?
9. If your answer to the question above is YES, what advantages does synthetic
securitisation have over typical securitisation models? Is this applicable to the
South African context?
10. What factors, in your view, would facilitate or alternatively threaten the continual
development of the credit derivatives in South Africa?
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11. In light of the recent turmoil in the emerging markets and the uncovering of
accounting scandals on a worldwide basis, what affect do these developm~nts
have on the credit derivative market in South Africa?
12. Other Comments?
12.4 Data Analysis Technique
Qualitative analyses of the responses to the questionnaire have been conducted. The
analysis seeks to highlight the practice of credit derivatives in South Africa and the extent
to which this differs from practice internationally. The analysis will also attempt to
discuss the key issues surrounding the further development of credit derivatives in South
Africa.
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13. BENEFITS OF THE RESEARCH UNDERTAKING
The benefit of the research undertaking would be to obtain clarity on the practice of
credit derivatives internationally and in South Africa. In particular, the following range
of topics would have been covered in the analysis of credit derivatives:
• The growth of the credit trading market internationally and in South Africa
• The identification of the basic credit derivative instruments. In this respect, the
credit default swap, credit-linked note and total return swap have been examined
• The uses, benefits, risks and advantages of credit derivatives in both the
international and South African context
• The pricing of credit derivative instruments and the determinants of credit
spreads. The potential problems in credit derivative pricing have been highlighted
• The legal risks associated with credit derivative documentation, with particular
reference to the efforts of the International Swaps and Derivatives Association
(ISDA), and
• The use of credit derivatives in synthetic securitisation
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14. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS OF THE DATA GATHERING STAGE
As indicated above, the research undertaking seeks to analyse the practice of credit
derivatives in South Africa and to make comparisons with the evolution of credit
derivatives internationally. In the process, the issues underlying the further development
of credit derivatives in South Africa have been highlighted. The research undertaking
should demonstrate that credit derivatives are arguably one of the most exciting
developments in the field of contemporary finance. If the evidence of the success of
credit derivatives internationally is anything to go by, credit derivatives is destined to
assume the same level of importance in South Africa as interest rate derivatives. As a
consequence of the infancy of credit derivatives in South Africa, there are currently few
practitioners. In particular, it appears that only the "big five" banks have established
trading and structuring desks to trade the domestic market. In particular, the following
banks have an active credit derivatives department - Standard Bank, NIB, Investec, Rand
Merchant Bank and ABSA. Of these institutions, it appears that Standard Bank, Investec
and NIB are fairly advanced in the development oftheir credit derivatives capability.
In light of this, an open-ended questionnaire was distributed to the relevant departments
of these institutions. At the outset, it was envisaged that, if anything, recording and
analyzing the views and practice of these institutions would accurately capture the
relevant issues in the evolution of credit derivatives in South Africa. On the downside, as
the number of market participants in the field increase, the views of the institutions
canvassed in the questionnaire may probably not reflect the reality of credit derivatives in
South Africa. In addition, due to such limited numbers of practitioners currently, it is
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envisaged that any analysis undertaken at this point in time may necessarily only begin to
unearth the dynamics of credit derivative practice in South Africa. Despite these
limitations, however, the research undertaking should highlight the teething questions
that may need to be resolved in order for credit derivative technology to fully develop in
South Africa. The responses and analysis to the questions posed are as follows -:
• In the estimation of the respondents, what is the size of the credit derivative market in
South Africa?
NIB Investment Bank (NIB) believes that this is difficult to accurately quantify the size
of the market, as the industry is very much in its infancy at the moment. In light of this,
NIB estimates the market size to be about 10 % of the size of the interest rate derivatives
market (i.e. swaps, caps/floors, FRAS and bond options). On the other hand, Investee
believes that the credit derivative market is currently trading at approximately R 30
billion. In contrast, Standard Corporate and Merchant Bank (SCMB) is of the view that
R 1 billion of credit default swaps and R 8 billion of credit-linked notes are traded on an
annual basis. On the face of it, therefore, there does not appear to be consensus on the
size of the credit derivative market in South Africa in view of the wide range of estimates
above. This discrepancy could perhaps be attributed to share of market that each
respondent bank currently enjoys in South Africa. The market size in South Africa is
therefore in the region from R 9 billion to 30 billion. This is in sharp contrast to the size
of the credit derivative market internationally, estimated to be in the region of $ 50,1
trillion. The size of the market is no doubt as attributable to the infancy of credit
derivatives in South Africa as the relative small number of potential market participants
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in South Africa as opposed to the USA or Europe. As indicated below, the relative
smallness of the market has a number of important effects on the continued development
of credit derivatives in the future. In particular, the research undertaking will
demonstrate that the pricing of credit derivative instruments is a difficult task in view of
the lack of liquidity in the South African market.
• What, in the respondent's VIew, IS the most frequently used credit derivative
instrument in South Africa?
In the view of SCMB, the credit-linked note is the most frequently used credit derivative
instrument in South Africa. This view is in fact corroborated by NIB and Investec. In
contrast, the international experience has proven to be different. The British Bankers'
Association survey, cited in a report in Financial Times (2002), estimates that the global
market for credit derivatives reached USD 1,189 billion, more than that estimated by the
BBA in its earlier surveys. According to the report, single name credit default swaps
continues to be the most important product forming 45% of the market. As to why this is
different in South Africa is not exactly clear from the evidence. A plausible explanation
may be that credit-linked notes offer protection from both market and credit risk whilst
the credit default swap offers investors protection from credit risk only. This difference
is particularly relevant in the context of a relatively more hostile interest and exchange
rate environment. The constant volatility of the rand dollar exchange rate as well as the
threat of increasing inflation has led to an environment of considerable market risk (in
addition to credit risk).
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• What are the most common uses for credit derivatives in South Africa?
In the experience of NIB, hedging is the most common use for credit derivatives in South
Africa. It is not clear whether this is in respect of credit risk only or market risk as well.
Further, it is also not clear from the response whether this is in respect of the bank's
lending activities or/and activities of all market participants in general. To some extent,
this view is consistent with Investee's own experience in the South African market place.
Investee argues that risk mitigation for banks overly exposed to specific sectors of the
market and the ability of investors to enhance their portfolio yields are the primary
drivers for using credit derivatives in South Africa. As far as risk mitigation for banks
are concerned, it is important to bear in mind that the credit environment in South Africa
(and worldwide) has deteriorated significantly in the last 36 months. This is inter alia a
function of many factors, including but not limited to depressed economic conditions.
This factor, together with the collapse of local banks, has meant that lending activities
have been largely confined to the "big five" banks. A consequence of this is that these
banks have become overly exposed to certain sectors of the economy. Hence, the need
for risk mitigation. The problem, however, is that it often difficult to offload credit risk
exposure to potential investors or other banks. This is on the basis that most if not all
banks already have significant exposure in a number of different economic sectors.
Institutional investors, for instance, have traditionally been precluded from investing a
significant portion of funds under management offshore as a result of restrictive exchange
control regulations. This has meant that investors have a limited number of investment
opportunities in South African, a factor that has led to significant over exposure to many
industries. The problem, therefore, is that there may not be a large number of investors
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willing to assume credit exposure via credit or other derivatives. Consistent with the
view of Investee, SCMB believes that risk mitigation in so far as laying off credit
exposure to the institutional investor market is the most common use for credit
derivatives in South Africa. This seems to imply that yield enhancement drives a
significant portion of credit derivative trades. A fundamental point to consider in the
context of yield enhancement for investors is the dearth of investment opportunities in
South Africa. As mentioned above, exchange control regulations have prevented
institutions from investing abroad. This factor has meant that there are too many
investors chasing too few credits. In addition, with the collapse of the small banking
sector in South Africa, investors have tended to place their funds in three or four of the
big banks - a factor that is considered to be undesirable as far as the need for
diversification of portfolio returns is concerned. Credit derivative paper appears to be a
viable investment alternative to traditional investment avenues. To summarise the
position in the South African market, it appears that credit derivatives are used mainly for
risk mitigation in the banking sector and yield enhancement in the institutional
investment market. This is consistent with the way credit derivatives are used
internationally i.e. hedging and yield pick up for institutional investors. However, there
appears to be one exception. Internationally, there is a significant element of speculation
in credit derivatives. For instance, in a total return swap, the total return payer does not
have to own any debt obligations of the underlying reference obligation in order to enter
into the total return swap. The total return payer can therefore use the total return swap to
"short" the market and credit risk of the reference obligation. The total return payer will
therefore benefit from any depreciation in the market value of the underlying reference
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obligation as an equivalent amount will be due, under the terms of the total return swap,
from the total return receiver. A particularly important feature in the use of credit
derivatives internationally is obtaining capital regulatory relief on banking transactions.
Although the local banks have not mentioned this particular aspect in their use of credit
derivatives when responding to this question, it does become apparent that they do in fact
consider reducing their capital risk weighting in the context of securitisation. This aspect
will be considered later.
• The South African Reserve Bank has recently proposed substantial amendments
to existing banking regulations to enable the practice of credit derivatives in South
Africa. What, in the view of the respondents, are the most significant issues
arising from the draft proposals?
Investee is of the view that the new regulations will enable banks to obtain regulatory
capital relief on exposures to counter parties. A feature of banking legislation is that
banks must reserve up to 10% of their total lending. As this is a non-economic loan,
reserving represents a cost to the bank that must be included in the pricing of the loan. A
credit derivative allows banks to offload credit exposure to willing investors, including
other banks. As a result, the banks may be allowed to reduce the capital risk weighting
from 10% to sometimes 0%. The bank may decide to pass these savings to the borrower
or retain the savings to enhance its margins.
According to Investee, the draft regulations will also permit banks to run trading books
and set up trading desks in much the same way as regulations allow the trading of interest
rate derivatives. SCMB has a different though not necessarily contradictory view of the
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effect of the draft legislation. In their view, the proposed legislation will have the effect
of reducing uncertainty in the trading and treatment of credit. In addition, the bank
believes that the draft legislation enables credit derivatives to be seen as an acceptable
product or risk mitigation tool and, if used correctly, obtain capital offset. By this, the
local banks will be allowed to offset one credit derivative exposure against the other. In
the period preceding the release of the draft legislation, the local banks believed that
should the legislation not allow capital offset, market growth may have been stymied. In
the view of SCMB, these factors will contribute towards the development of the domestic
market, as investors will be assured of proper regulation and control. NIB did not offer a
response to this question, for reasons that are not exactly clear from the questionnaire.
Internationally, the regulatory environment had been established for some time allowing
credit derivatives to flourish. This has especially been the case in the United States and
Europe. The regulatory model adopted in many· countries is based on guidelines
established by BASEL, an association of international banks. It is anticipated that
changes to domestic legislation will largely follow the widely accepted BASEL model.
• What pricing model does your institution employ in determining the appropriate
price of a credit derivative? Are they any shortcomings in the pricing model chosen?
The respondents were unanimous in their choice of a pricing model, namely a derivative
of KMV, which is based on option pricing. Briefly, a credit product is regarded as a
contingent claim on the assets of the issuer and is valued according to option pricing
theory. Merton produced the first academic model in this class in 1974. Merton
observed that corporate issuers have the option to default and will probably exercise it
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should the firm's assets fall below the face value of the debt. The model relies heavily on
the assumption that there is a strong relationship between credit risk and the price of
equity. The time period to a potential default is determined by tracking the value of the
underlying reference credit under various assumptions and is assumed to occur when this
process meets a predetermined boundary. In its simplest form, the methodology prices
credit risk as a deep-out-of-the-money put option on the assets of the firm with a strike
price equal to the predetermined boundary.
• Does the respondent institution employ the same model to pnce all credit
derivatives?
Once again, the respondents unanimously stated that all credit derivative instruments are
priced using the same pricing model i.e. a derivative of KMV.
• In VIew of the infancy of credit derivatives III South Africa, what pncmg
challenges, if any, does the respondent face?
Investec argues that there were many factors currently inhibiting the effective pricing of
credit derivatives in South Africa. Firstly, a lack of a corporate bond market in South
Africa prevents a bank or trader from correctly identifying the appropriate price for an
instrument. A lack of corporate bonds implies that there is a dearth of observable market
prices to verify and test the appropriateness of a pricing model. Secondly, many
companies in South Africa have not been formerly rated by a credit rating agency of
international standing. A credit rating enables market participants to gain valuable
insight into the financial and credit worthiness of a company, which, in turn facilitates
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effective pricing. In the absence of a credit rating, the classical problem of asymmetrical
information exists. In other words, the investor does not have access to the same .level of
information as the company owners do. This may lead to a situation where the owners of
the company may exploit its informational advantage, a factor that causes market
participants to refrain from assuming credit risk via credit derivatives or other
instruments. Thirdly, the presence of wide bid/offer spreads also prevents the accurate
pricing of credit derivatives by making it prohibitively expensive. The current spreads
may in fact be a function a cause and effect of the factors above, causing a never-ending
cycle of inaccurate pricing. Potential investors may be reluctant to enter the market until
bid/offer spreads narrow significantly. Finally, Investec is of the view that a lack of
market participants means that there is a lack of a viable market pricing mechanism to
validate the pricing results of the models. Both NIB and SCMB are in agreement. Once
again, the lack of market participants may be both a cause and effect of a number of
factors mentioned above. In many ways, the pricing problems experienced in South
Africa are consistent with the experience internationally, although there are some
important differences. As discussed above, Kumar (2001) argues that protection against
specific credit risk is still hard to find at the right price and at the right time. Until the
market is liquid and competitively priced, many companies will often prefer not to hedge
credit risks or may opt for traditional cover such as credit insurance, bank guarantees,
factoring or state guarantees. According to Kumar (2001), non-financial firms are
extremely reluctant to enter into any kind of hedge. Credit default swaps, for example,
are often more expensive than letters of credit. But, as Kumar (2001) argues, this is often
because credit derivatives are not priced accurately. However, insurance and capital
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markets are converging, and credit is increasingly priced in the credit default market. As
a result, such inefficiencies should disappear (Kumar, 2001). The bankers are apparently
waiting for two things: for credit default spreads to narrow, and for stock market
investors to start recognizing the value of companies actively managing their credit risk.
Internationally, the problem is that credit default swaps have not evolved smoothly and
logically (Kumar, 2001). Kurnar cites a derivatives trader "interest in credit protection
comes sporadically and it comes with market crises. It spiked after the Russian and
Asian crises, and it has spiked again with the downgrade of the telecoms companies. But
that interest comes too late for the markets concerned because protection prices have
already widened too far."
Liquidity in the credit derivatives market has improved substantially, and it now easy to
place transactions worth $ 500 million or more. This is, however, true primarily of major
names that are generally listed. Unrated companies or those rated below investment
grade remain illiquid, and these are precisely the kind of companies that most buyers of
credit protection are exposed to. Internationally however, some industries may have no
choice but to go down the credit derivative route despite the expensive price tags, if only
to improve their declining credit ratings or obtain further financing (Kumar, 2001). Most
international banks and investors may be lenient to companies willing to hedge their
credit exposures. "Having an actively traded credit derivatives market for a certain name
improves liquidity for the issuer. The kinds of products that can be issued vary greatly in
such a situation", says Kumar (2001). She goes on to state, "credit risk is not
standardized in the way it is confirmed and written. Sometimes it is does not lend itself
to being hedged. The exposure a company has with a counter party is not a bond or a
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loan. These are standard in the credit derivatives market. So, if there is a default, you
have a mismatch. If you want to fully hedge the exposure, they need a different contract
from the credit derivatives floor business. So it becomes very expensive." In summary
therefore, despite the large volumes of credit derivative trades internationally, the
accurate pricing of credit derivatives is still a difficult task. The market is confident,
however, that problems relating to the lack of liquidity may improve going forward and
anticipate a bright future for credit derivative pricing.
• Synthetic securitisation IS widely believed to be the preferred model for
securitisation in the future. Do the respondent banks agree with this statement? And
why?
With the exception of Investee, both SCMB and NIB agree that synthetic securitisation is
the preferred model for securitisation in the future. In support of its view, NIB believes
that synthetic securitisation achieves capital regulatory relief. In other words, the banks
are able to transfer credit risk relating to its loan exposures to third parties thereby
reducing regulatory capital required to be held. It is debatable whether this is something
achieved by synthetic securitisation only. In fact, many practitioners would argue that
securitisation per se (whether synthetic or otherwise) is structured so as to achieve capital
relief and this is perhaps one of the main driving forces compelling banks to securitise
their book. In support of its view, SCMB argues that synthetic instruments effect a
transfer of credit risk more cheaply than an outright sale. Although not given, a plausible
explanation might be that credit derivative documentation has been significantly
standardised by ISDA. This does not appear to be the case with conventional
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securitisation structures. In contrast, Investee does not believe that synthetic
securitisation is the preferred model for securitisation. Although synthetic securitisation
achieves the desired risk and capital relief, what it does not achieve is the ability to raise
cash. In the view of Investee, this is often the primary reason for companies using
securitisation structures. Investee refutes the view that institutions like SA Home Loans
do not have a place in the market. SA Home Loans is a vehicle established to securitise
home loans. By disintermediating (i.e. funds are raised via the capital market directly as
opposed to banks), SA Home Loans is able to achieve savings from not having to reserve
against exposures as in the case of banks.
Internationally, synthetic securitisation is the preferred choice for banks seeking to
manage regulatory and risk capital, especially in Europe (Bund, 2001). By some
estimates, synthetic securitisation represents about 25 % of total European asset backed
securities (ABS) in 2000, and a similar portion of issuance in the US (Bund, 2001). As
stated above, the picture is not so clear in South Africa. In cases where the raising of
cash is not a primary consideration, synthetic securitisation will perhaps be the preferred
model. In the banking sector, for instance, depositors are withdrawing funds from the
small banks and depositing money with the large banks, caused by the collapse of the
small banks. As a result, the large banks in South Africa have excess capital with very
few opportunities to invest. Together with restrictive exchange control regulations
prohibiting substantial investments offshore, banks certainly do not need to free up
capital in the loan book portfolio. However, as far as the non-financial private sector is
concerned, raising cash would probably be the driving force for implementing a
securitisation transaction. In light of this, conventional securitisation structures are more
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appropriate. The raising of cash via the securitisation route is an alternative means of
raising cash and could leave vital credit lines from banks unencumbered.
• What factors, in the respondents view, would alternatively facilitate or threaten the
development of credit derivatives in South Africa?
NIB cites the legal framework as a factor threatening the further development of credit
derivatives in South Africa. According to NIB, credit derivatives are invoked when there
is default and when markets are in turmoil. This leaves room for counter parties to mount
legal challenges to determine what for instance constitutes default. NIB believes that
clarity on the legal front would aid in the growth of the market. Interestingly, the initial
debate internationally around the legal issues also related to the definition of "default" in
the documentation. However, this debate has recently been resolved by the
standardisation of legal documents in terms of guidelines produced by ISDA. The issue
internationally is whether the current definitions in the ISDA document remain valid or
require revision in light of developments worldwide. To some extent therefore, the
debate internationally has progressed from initial controversies relating to the definition
of a default. It does still appear, however, that the legal framework is still relatively
unclear as far as credit derivatives are concerned. In this regard, the similarities locally
and worldwide are quite evident. Investec, on the other hand, cites other factors
threatening the further development of credit derivatives. Briefly, these are as follows:
Regulations were recently introduced in South Africa that prevent money market funds
from participating in credit derivative instruments. This appears to have reduced trading
activity as an important distribution channel has been removed. Investec is currently
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negotiating with the financial regulatory authorities to remove such restrictions and to
revisit the function of the legislation. At this stage in time, it is not clear wh~ther the
outcome of the negotiations would be successful. This does not appear to be the case in
the US or Europe, making it a unique problem to South Africa. SCMB, on the other
hand, cites a lack of market participants as a stumbling block. Presumably, this means
that the lack of liquidity is preventing the market from correctly pricing the instruments.
Internationally, liquidity is only a concern in respect of private companies that are
generally unrated. In the case of multi-nationals listed on the major bourses, there are a
sufficient number of players/participants willing to conclude contracts. If anything, this
remains the essential difference between the local and international market.
• In light of the recent turmoil in the emergmg markets and the uncovenng of
accounting scandals, what effect do these developments have on the credit derivative
market in South Africa?
In Investec's view, the accounting scandals make fund managers nervous which has the
effect of limiting the universe of acceptable investments. Investec further states that the
scandals will have a marginal effect on credit spreads but given exchange control
regulations, this will not be nearly as severe as happened internationally. SCMB is in
agreement adding that the scandals will cause investors to be more risk averse. In
contrast, NIB believes that the recent events are all positive for credit derivatives, as they
have held up well in the face of recent defaults. Internationally, the perception of credit
derivatives is embodied by Alan Greenspan, the Governor of the Reserve Bank of the
United States. In his recent address in London, Greenspan had several words of praise for
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securitisation and credit derivatives. As a result of financial innovation, Greenspan
argued that the U.S. economy is more shock-resistant, adding that the economy has "held
firm" through terrorist attacks, a stock market crash and a slump in the business
environment. Addressing a meeting of central bankers, the Fed chairman consistently
praised the innovative powers of world financial markets and urged regulators not to
interfere. In the U.S., he said, the country's massive secondary-mortgage market has
helped keep the economy afloat by letting homeowners cash in on increases in property
pnces.
In his view, credit default swaps, collateralized debt obligations and credit-linked notes
have also helped make the economy shock- resistant. "Such instruments appear to have
effectively spread losses from defaults by Enron, Global Crossing, Railtrack, WorldCom
and Swissair in recent months from financial institutions with large short-term leverage to
insurance firms, pension funds, or others with diffuse long-term liabilities or no liabilities
at all," he said. Despite some views to the contrary, the recent scandals have appeared to
enhance the value of credit derivatives internationally and in South Africa.
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15 CONCLUSION
In the research undertaking, the literature relating to the role and practice of credit
derivatives internationally was reviewed. In this respect, the following issues were
identified as significant:
• The growth of the credit trading market internationally and in South Africa
• The identification of the basic credit derivative instruments.
• The uses, benefits, risks and advantages of credit derivatives internationally and in
South Africa
• The pricing of credit derivative instruments and the determinants of credit
spreads.
• The legal risks associated with credit derivative documentation, with particular
reference to the efforts of the International Swaps and Derivatives Association
(ISDA), and
• The use of credit derivative technology III the evolution of the synthetic
securitisation market
A comparison between local and international practice was thereafter made. In the
process, the major issues requiring discussion were identified. A questionnaire outlining
the critical issues was distributed to the major players in South Africa and an analysis
conducted in light of the literature reviewed. NIB, SCMB and Investee are currently
perceived to be the major participants in the South African market. The following issues
were canvassed in the questionnaire:
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• The size of the credit derivative market in South Africa. In particular, the most
frequently used instrument was identified
• The views of the respondents in respect of pricing were identified. In this regard, the
issues relating to the problem of determining the appropriate price for credit
derivative instruments were canvassed
• The questionnaire then proceeded to explore the complex issue of synthetic
securitisation, and the extent to which this could be regarded as an enhanced form of
traditional securitisation
• The effect of the accounting and corporate governance scandals taking place
internationally (e.g. Enron) on the development of credit derivatives in South Africa
was explored
• Finally, the respondents were asked to identify the factors that would, in their view,
contribute or inhibit the growth of credit derivatives.
Credit derivatives are privately negotiated bilateral contracts that allow users to manage
their exposure to credit risk. For example, a bank concerned that one of its customers
may not be able to repay a loan can protect itself against loss by transferring the credit
risk to another party while keeping the loan on its books. Credit risk is the possibility
that a borrower will fail to service or repay a debt on time. The degree of risk is reflected
in the borrower's credit rating, which defines the premium over the risk free borrowing
rate it pays for funds and ultimately the market price of its debt. There are essentially
three main types of credit derivative instruments used worldwide and in South Africa.
These are (1) credit default swaps, (2) total return swaps and (3) credit-linked notes. Of
the three basic instruments, there are many different variations. From an analysis of the
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literature and practice internationally, credit default swaps appear to be the most
commonly used credit derivative instrument. It is estimated to constitute about 25 % of
all credit derivative trades. In contrast, the practitioners in South Africa tend to use
credit-linked notes more often than other instruments, which are estimated to be in the
region of about R 8 billion. A possible explanation may be that credit-linked notes
provide protection against both market and credit risk while credit default s~aps provide
protection against credit risk only. In the context of the South African economic and
monetary environment, this factor appears to be critical. The primary advantage in using
credit derivatives is the ability to offload credit risk to participants willing to assume it
and the flexibility to enhance portfolio yields. A significant disadvantage is the
assumption of credit risk by investors not sufficiently knowledge in the financial state of
the company and the complexity of legal documentation. As far as the pricing of credit
derivatives is concerned, the literature suggests that most practitioners use a variation of
KMV, which is based on the option-pricing model developed by Scholes in 1974. A
fundamental requirement of the model is the availability of information, which is
normally derived from credit rating agencies. A credit rating is ordinarily performed on
listed companies. A consequence of this is that it is reasonably simple to value a credit
derivative in respect of listed companies. This is on the basis that the option pricing
methodology uses information peculiar to listed companies e.g. share price, expected
default probabilities etc. A corollary of this therefore, is that it is difficult to value
exposures in respect of private companies, a factor that is increasingly evident in the
international sphere. Not surprising, the KMV model is also extensively used in South
Africa. The problems experienced in pricing are exacerbated in South Africa by the lack
97
of ratings even in respect of many listed compames. Together with informational
asymmetries arising from the lack of such information, many potential investors ,tend to
be cautious in their approach to credit derivatives. A related issue is to what extent does
the infancy of the market in South Africa impact on the pricing of the instruments.
Liquidity is clearly important to establish a robust market that enables the price of
instruments to be set by market participants. Internationally, the literature clearly
demonstrates that as a result of the large volumes in the US and Europe, issues relating to
liquidity is not a significant factor. However, a distinction has to be made between public
listed companies and private entities. In respect of private entities, the literature clearly
indicates there are no critical volumes to enable the correct pricing of instruments. In
South Africa, the problem appears to be more deep-seated than this. In particular,
regardless of whether the entity seeking protection is listed or not, there is simply no
critical mass or volume. This causes unease amongst investors and protection buyers
alike.
Synthetic securitisation is defined as a structured transaction in which the originating
banks use credit derivatives to transfer the risk of a specified pool of assets via a
bankruptcy remote vehicle ("SPV") to investors without actually selling the assets
themselves. The pool of assets could be loans, bonds, derivatives, lines of credit and/or
illiquid securities. The transfer into the SPY can be made using funded credit derivatives
such as credit-linked notes and/or unfunded credit derivatives such as credit default
swaps and/or total return swaps. Synthetic securitisation involves a transfer of risk and
not a sale of underlying pool of assets. There are two types of synthetic structures, a
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leveraged and an unfunded structure. Of the many benefits of synthetic securitisation, the
primary is the offloading of credit risk and obtaining capital relief in respect of banks.
On the question of whether synthetic securitisation is an enhanced form of securitisation,
the experience internationally is quite categorical. Synthetic structures largely outnumber
conventional securitisation. In South Africa, however, the views are quite ambivalent.
Some express the view that securitisation is normally undertaken to raise cash and
therefore synthetic structures are not appropriate, bearing in mind that synthetic structures
transfer credit risk only without there being an outright sale of the underlying assets.
Others believe that risk mitigation and capital regulatory relief drives securitisation,
which makes synthetic structures more suitable. As far as the impact of Enron on credit
derivatives internationally is concerned, most commentators agree that the impact has
been positive and anticipate a growth in the market. In their view, Enron provided an
environment in which the viability of credit derivatives could be tested, the result being
extremely positive. In contrast, the practitioners in South Africa were fairly divided in
their assessment of "Enron". One of the respondents expressed the view that credit
derivatives could be cast in a negative light and rejected as a potential investment tool
while others believed, like the commentators internationally, that "Enron" could be
positive for credit derivatives. This is certainly an issue that would need to be assessed in
the future.
In the final stage, the factors prohibiting the further growth of credit derivatives in South
Africa were identified. Although these factors can not be regarded as insurmountable, it
would certainly need to addressed before credit derivatives assumes the same level of
importance in South Africa as does interest rate derivatives. In the first instance the
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corporate bond market would have to grow in leaps and bounds. Although significant
progress has been made in the last twenty-four months in this regard, the market is
currently unstable and could easily disappear. This could be caused by, inter alia, rising
interest rates with the consequence that debt becomes more expensive than equity as a
form of finance. This does not appear to the problem internationally in view of the large
issues of corporate bond paper. The significance of an active corporate bond is the
creation of a liquid and transparent credit market. Additionally, and as consequence of
the factors above, the number of market participants would need to increase substantially
to further enhance the liquidity of the market. A liquid market enables participants to
price credit derivatives correctly. An issue that causes considerable concern in South
Africa is the promulgation of regulations prohibiting money market funds from
participating in the credit derivative market. An important distribution channel has been
eliminated and that has had a noticeable effect on volumes in the last year. A further
stumbling block appears to be the legal risks assumed in credit derivative documentation.
As definitions and contracts continue to be standardized as a result of the initiatives of
ISDA, this factor may become less important in the future. In contrast, the drafting and
proposed promulgation of banking regulations enabling banks to participate in the
market, will almost certainly cause credit derivatives to be regarded as a viable
instrument. In the view of the research undertaking, the growth of credit derivatives in
South Africa will ultimately be driven by two factors. Firstly, banks intent on reducing
their capital risk weighting, will seek to offload credit exposure. This could easily be
achieved via a synthetic securitisation structure. The second factor is the lack of
investment opportunities in South Africa caused by, inter alia, the existence of restrictive
100
exchange controls. An undesirable consequence of this is that funds under management
tend to be invested in a few entities. Credit derivatives could provide a viable investment
vehicle to investors in desperate need of yield enhancement and diversification.
On balance, credit derivatives are an exciting innovation in South Africa. Although there
are many factors inhibiting its growth, these are by no means insurmountable. In the
view of the writer, credit derivatives are destined to become an important feature of the
South African financial landscape.
IDI
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